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ABSTRACT
This qualitative analysis of the framing of health issues by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, one of the world’s premier health organizations, and by major U.S.
newspapers analyzes the frames present in a sample of the CDC’s press releases, and the frames
present in the contemporaneous (and often resulting) press coverage. This study focuses on
communication surrounding public health events that occurred in the six-year period 2002–2007.
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Introduction:
Much has been written on the “power of the press”: the power journalists, editors, and
publishers have to decide what the issues are and how to frame them. Some say this with an
ominous tone, and blame the news media for a wide variety of societal ills. Others explain that
the frames, the contexts, we use to make sense of the world around us are a part of us, and are the
only way we know how to convey meaning to others.
The field of public relations, on the other hand, exercises a very deliberate kind of
framing, and they exercise this on the press. Many public relations professionals deal directly
with the public; others compose the press releases used to entice the press to cover a story, and to
do it from a particular angle.
The U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, known worldwide as the CDC, is a
globally important force for public health and health communication. The CDC sees their
messages mediated in the press frequently. They also have a press office. This study analyzes the
framing involved in the CDC’s press releases on certain health issues, as well as in the press
stories that cover the same issues.

2

Research Questions
The CDC knows what their health communication goals are when they disseminate a
press release on a certain issue. Are their uses of framing, and their adherence to best practices
supporting their goals? Through the lens of framing and best practices, I looked at how the CDC
could address the journalistic need for balance, multiple viewpoints, information, revenue, and
readership in a way that can help increase the effectiveness of their releases.
In cases in which the CDC disseminated press releases in response to a health risk event
that also received coverage in the following major newspapers: USA Today, the New York Times,
the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Atlanta Journal Constitution.
•

How has the CDC framed to present health risks and crisis events in their press
releases?

•

How have major U.S. newspapers framed the same public health events?

•

How can the CDC use the current body of evidence to improve its practices and
increase its effectiveness?

•

Do the press releases reflect the lessons some of the agency’s authors say they
have learned?

3

Research Theory
In this study I examined specific episodes of health risk- and crisis-related press releases
disseminated by the CDC between 2002 and 2007. An archive of the CDC’s press releases is
available on the CDC Web site. 1 The practice is to archive all of the press releases, and I have
looked at all of the releases on this site for the time period between 2002 and 2007. 2
I also studied press coverage of the same episodes in five major U.S. newspapers: USA
Today, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, and the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, also for the time period between 2002 and 2007. These newspaper articles
were available via the Factiva and ProQuest databases. The New York Times was chosen as it is
regarded as the nation’s newspaper of record. The Washington Post is almost as highly regarded,
and is located in the U.S. capital, which is also home to the administration and the department
under whose control the CDC operates. The Los Angeles Times was chosen as a well-respected
representation from the west coast. USA Today was selected as the country’s only widelyaccepted national newspaper. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was included as it is part of the
same community as the CDC, and therefore has a different view of (and different access to) the
CDC than any other major paper in the country. The newspaper samples included any editorial
text (including letters to the editor and op-ed pieces) related to the topic that appeared between
January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2007. One advertisement was included as an outlier because
it prompted a direct response from the CDC in the form of a press release, and without the
advertisement as context, the press release made little sense.

1

http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/archives.htm
The practice is to archive all of the press releases, so I have operated under the assumption that they have
done so.

2
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The CDC communications in this study came in the form of press releases focusing on
specific health issues or events. The West Nile and listeriosis events used as case studies in this
research were chosen because two represented clusters of press releases addressing a finite issue.
The autism case was chosen because it was an ongoing issue with a heavy communication need,
and it provided contrast to the other two. The following sets of keywords were used in finding
newspaper articles. For West Nile virus, the search term was “WNV_AND_organ.” For
listeriosis, “lister*” was used. For autism, “autis*_AND_vaccin*” was used. For all three,
articles found (once read) to not pertain to the topic were excluded.
Important themes involving various ways of manipulating and controlling public opinion
emerged from the literature review. Concepts that occurred frequently were media monitoring,
public appearance of the agency, setting the tone and agenda for the conversation, and taking
control of a situation, in addition to genuine motives of promoting public health and safety.
Based on preliminary research, I analyzed the press releases and newspaper stories for the
presence of framing in order to explore how these two important health information sources are
exerting influence over health issues.

Framing Theory
Framing is the process by which a person decides what pieces of information to present
when conveying a story to someone else. Framing relies on the symbols and assumptions people
use to make sense of everything they experience. It is an essential and unavoidable part of human
communication, and much of the time it is done subconsciously. However, when applied
purposefully, framing can be used to shape a message to the advantage of the communicator.
Public relations practitioners engage in specific, intentional framing, but the same cannot
always be said for news reporting. Michael Schudson said that despite the assumption of some
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media critics that it is possible to operate with complete objectivity, and that any deviation from
complete fairness represents a bias, editors, media executives, and reporters must use judgment
in choosing what to report and how to report it. In other words, objectivity should not be defined
from lack of bias, and to expect pure objectivity in all cases is unreasonable and sometimes
irresponsible. He gave as examples “whether to publish a letter or tract from a terrorist…or to air
a videotape from Osama Bin Laden…whether to reveal or conceal information that might bear
on national security, especially during time of war” or to “play down a murder or suicide because
they fear it could inspire copycats.” 3 In many cases, some bias reflects a responsibility to the
preservation of a civil, free society. 4
Whatever the causes of bias, Schudson argued that “intentional, ideologically driven, or
politically motivated bias does not dominate U.S. news institutions.” 5 Rather, frames are more
useful and relevant to study. Schudson quoted Todd Gitlin, saying that frames are “‘persistent
patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by
which symbol-handlers organize discourse…’” 6
Schudson described framing as being absolutely central to the study of news. Framing, he
said, “moves the analysis of news away from the idea of intentional bias. That is, to acknowledge
that news stories frame reality is also to acknowledge that it would be humanly impossible to
avoid framing. Every narrative account of reality necessarily presents some things and not
others; consciously or unconsciously, every narrative makes assumptions about how the world
works, what is important, what makes sense, and what should be.” 7 Therefore, Schudson said, to

3

Michael Schudson. The Sociology of News. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2003, 34.
Ibid.
5
Schudson, 35.
6
Schudson, 35, quoting Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1979.
7
Schudson, 35–36.
4
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examine framing instead of intentional bias shifts the discussion to the unintentional perspectives
people use to interpret events and symbols around them, rather than viewing “evidence of
selection…as evidence of deceit, dissembling, or prejudice of individual journalists; it also draws
attention to ways journalists select certain traditions and routines of the culture at large and the
news business specifically.” 8
Chong and Druckman discussed framing theory at some length, starting with early mass
public opinion research in the 1950s and 1960s. This early work seemed to indicate that the
public is fickle and holds few stable, consistent, informed opinions. 9 The authors considered
“framing within the broader democratic process that links politicians and other opinion leaders to
the public, primarily through the mass media,” also saying that “(t)he major premise of framing
theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having
implications fro multiple values or considerations.” 10
Chong and Druckman paraphrase previous research by Tuchman, 11 Shah et al., 12 and
Gamson and Modigliani, 13 saying communication frames “‘organize everyday reality’ by
providing ‘meaning to an unfolding strip of events’ and ‘promoting ‘particular definitions and
interpretations of political issues.’” 14 The authors wrote that a frame is only definable “in
relation to a specific issue, event, or political actor,” and that researching these frames requires
isolating specific attitudes. That is, a researcher can study overall attitudes about one specific

8

Ibid, 37.
Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman.,“Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science
10 (2007): 103–104.
10
Ibid., 104.
11
See Tuchman 1978, 193.
12
See Shah et al. 2002, 343.
13
See Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 143; 1989.
14
Ibid., 106.
9
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issue, though “different frames may underlie each of these attitudes.” Additionally, framing for
the same issue can be different at different points in history. 15
Johnson-Cartee conducted a detailed review of the literature on framing. She quoted
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley’s 1997 definition of framing, describing it as “the process by which
a communication source, such as a news organization [or a political leader, public relations
officer, political advertising consultant, or a news consumer] 16 , defines and constructs a political
issue or public controversy.” She also quoted Tankard et al. (1991), saying “a frame is the central
organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through
the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration.”
Media framing research, according to Johnson-Cartee, “examines how news content
influences and affects news consumers.” 17 She lists many of the concepts various researchers
have used to look at frames. She said, “when people engage in public discourse about political,
economic, or social issues, they are engaging in public deliberation or the very essence of
democracy. And when people engage in (collective and open) deliberation…they are necessarily
engaged in issue framing.” The author also wrote that framing research can look at media or
individual frames; 18 it is the former that I will be looking at in my study of the same issues as
framed by both the newspaper media and a stakeholding federal agency.
Hallahan looked at seven models of framing he said applied to public relations. He
discussed framing as tied to the “psychological processes that people use to examine

15

Chong and Druckman, 106.
Italics preserved from original.
17
Ibid, 25.
18
Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, News Narratives and Framing (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2005), 24–25.
16
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information” 19 and thus useful for studying the effects of public relations. Framing involves
inclusion, exclusion, and emphasis. 20 Ways of framing include valence framing (positive or
negative), semantic framing (word choice), and story framing (storytelling in support of a
theme). 21 Priming is also an important part of framing; this process calls to mind any of a
number of contexts or expectations under which something can be understood. 22 He listed the
seven concepts that can be used in framing as situations, attributes, choices, actions, issues,
responsibility, and news. 23
Framing of issues plays an important part in policy debate; therefore this idea is also
useful to study of CDC communication and news. Hallahan defined an issue as “a
dispute…usually over the allocation of resources or the treatment or portrayal of groups in
society” and that they often need to be solved in a public forum. 24 Issues may have financial ,
ethical, moral, social, or other aspects to them, and this contributes to agenda-setting as well as
framing. Hallahan also said that “public health issues have been shown to be dramatically
influenced by the way they are represented.” 25
Hallahan found framing to be very important to news reporting, as frames often
determine “how stories are portrayed…in an effort to explain complex or abstract ideas in
familiar, culturally resonating terms.” 26 Reporters investigating one incident may put that
incident in the context of other people or things it may affect, or they may frame it in a broader
concept for dramatic affect. “As the drama unfolds,” said Hallahan, “roles are…assigned to
19

Kirk Hallahan. “Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public Relations.” Journal of Public Relations
Research 11, no. 3 (1999): 205–242.
20
Ibid., 207.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., 208
23
Ibid., 210.
24
Ibid., 217.
25
Ibid., 218.
26
Ibid., 221

9
victims and villains” and responsibility may also be assigned. 27 Examples of these “genres”
which may apply to reporters writing about the CDC could include organizational corruption,
safety lapses, government ineptitude in enacting or enforcing policies, waste, community
activism, and the like. Episodic framing also applies; that refers to the coverage of news from an
individual perspective. It exists in opposition to thematic framing, which covers issues at a
societal level, often in terms of abstract concepts.
Lawrence Wallack et al. describe media framing as an important topic of study because
of the effects of the resulting coverage:
The mass media have a two-step function. First, they select certain
people and events for attention and thus contribute to setting the
public agenda. Second, they frame the issue, telling the audience
what is important to know about the story…the media may indeed
tell people not only what issue to think about but how to think
about that issue. 28
The authors described framing as the process of selecting what information to include
and exclude when writing (or filming) a news story. They said that “despite ideals of
objectivity,” the reality of reporting is that the “reporting, shaping, and presentation of news and
information are subjective. Everything cannot be said about every issue in the short space of a
newspaper article or television broadcast.”29 Furthermore, they said the decisions about what to

27

Ibid.
Lawrence Wallack, et al. Media Advocacy and Public Health: Power for Prevention. (Newbury Park,
California: Sage Publications, 1993), 67. The authors posited the latter in contrast to Cohen’s (1963) “oftcited” saying that the media don’t tell people what to think, but they tell them what to think about. This same
axiom is cited in John R. Finnegan Jr. and K. Viswanath, “Communication Theory and Health Behavior
Change.” in Health Behavior and Health Education, eds. Karen Glanz, Barbara K. Rimer, and Frances
Marcus Lewis (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 372.
29
Wallack et al., 67.
28
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include or exclude from a story are based on “professional training and personal experience,”
and that the meaning of this collection of facts is “shaped by the context in which they are
presented.” 30
Wallack et al. wrote of a few different methods by which framing takes place; they
assume that a news story is about a problem of some sort, and argue that framing serves to assign
responsibility for that problem. Journalists can frame using images and symbols, choice of
spokespeople, word choice, and by defining the problem (or problems that make up an issue) on
different levels. 31 Symbols used in public health stories may include images or imagery of lab
coats and test tubes to connote science or medicine, or of flags and official seals to connote the
authority of government spokespersons. 32 The authors said that “framing social and public health
problems in the mass media occurs in a predictable way, based in American individualism” 33 and
also that “because the media reflect mainstream views of American society, they will usually
frame issues to portray the overall social system as fundamentally sound.” 34 Because of these
things, problems are often portrayed as being aberrances based on individual action rather than
corruptions or flaws in any given system. Referring to issues in terms of individual corruption,
carelessness, mistake, irresponsibility, accidents or acts of God (the latter two of which can be
construed as blameless), the authors said, “the media and their audience end up ignoring basic
structural problems regarding how society is organized.” 35
Groups manage to get coverage on their issues by framing them as newsworthy 36 and/or
by framing them as a specific kind of (usually oversimplified) content. 37 Framing for content
30

Ibid., 68.
Wallack et al., 68.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., 69.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid., 80. (“Framing for Newsworthiness”)
31
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involves reframing a personal issue as a social issue, shifting the blame away from the
individual, and presenting a solution. This may also involve making bits of information more
accessible through “media bites” (the press equivalent of a sound bite would be a pullout quote),
illustrative statistics (e.g., lung cancer kills X number of people a year, enough to fill the local
stadium, etc.), and tailoring news to directly address a particular audience. 38
Framing for access refers to “structur(ing) stories so they meet the criteria of what
constitutes news.” 39 This includes anniversaries, controversies, breakthroughs, milestones,
injustice, irony, seasonal issues, and other angles. 40 The ones mentioned here all pertain to health
reporting.
In specifically addressing health and medical issues, the authors said health issues are
portrayed in the same fashion. When risk factors for a disease or condition feature lifestyle
components, those are emphasized. 41 Based on the authors’ arguments, for example, an article
about obesity would focus on a person’s responsibilities with regard to physical activity and diet.
However, while this may continue to be the case, public health research in recent years
has increasingly applied ecological models 42 to analyzing health behaviors, focusing on
environmental causes for some conditions. In addition to the personal responsibility involved in
preventing obesity, many articles and studies have looked at underlying environmental reasons
people may not observe recommendations on physical activity or diet. Is it safe to walk in the
person’s neighborhood? Are there sidewalks? Is there violent crime? Do the person’s work and

37

Ibid., 82.
Ibid., 105-113.
39
Ibid., 97-105.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid., 69.
42
James F. Sallis and Neville Owen, “Ecological Models of Health Behavior,” in Health Behavior and Health
Education, eds. Karen Glanz, Barbara K. Rimer, and Frances Marcus Lewis (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
2002), 468-479.
38
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family responsibilities legitimately leave no time for exercise or food preparation? Does the
person know how to prepare healthy meals? If the person does not have access to a car, can they
easily get to a store that sells fresh fruits and vegetables? Or are junk food and sodas the only
things easily affordable and accessible? 43 These kinds of questions appearing in more and more
research, and subsequently they are showing up in more and more press reports.
Wallack et al. pointed out that the perception that “social and health problems are
individual problems pervades society and is reinforced through framing in the mass media.” 44
The authors said this is so despite the preponderance of ecological boundaries and influences that
are beyond the control of the individual, but that influence the actions of the individual.
Examples the authors gave include a large volume of misleading marketing messages from
alcohol and tobacco companies, and the fact that federal agencies are charged with researching
and preventing AIDS, yet are prohibited at times from using the word “condom” in their mass
media materials. 45
Groups often frame themselves and their issues as defined in opposition to other groups
and issues; this is known as a contested frame. Wallack et al. said that “facts are presented and
interpreted via cultural symbols,” often ones that evoke strong images or symbols, and positive
or negative emotions. 46 One example the authors give is the tobacco debate, in which the tobacco
companies cast themselves as “protector of free choice” and their anti-tobacco opponents as
“health fascists” and “government interventionalists.” The anti-tobacco campaigners in return
managed to frame the tobacco industry as deceitful “merchants of death.”47

43

Ibid.
Wallack, et al., 69-70.
45
Ibid., 70.
46
Ibid., 70-71.
47
Ibid., 71.
44
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The news media, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in episodic and thematic
framing. The news, they argued, generally uses episodic framing—a “short, simple, and personal
story” such as one that looks at one person—to represent issues. 48 This, they said, serves to
“reinforce an exceptionalist, individualistic frame for social problems.” 49 Thematic framing, they
said, provide a more complex, abstract, and broad view of an issue, often presenting data
scientific reports to back up claims. The authors described thematic framing as “present(ing) the
collective case of an issue rather than the individual or personal one.” 50 Much of their arguments
on episodic and thematic framing focused on Iyengar’s 1991 work on television news, 51 but
similar framing does appear in newspaper coverage.
Framing theory has its place in public health. Finnegan and Viswanath described framing
as “organized public discourse about an issue leading to the selection of features and the
exclusion of others”; in a public health application, “advocacy groups (would) ‘package’ an
important health issue for the media and the public.” 52 In fact, the CDC’s sister organization, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH, also a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services) encouraged public health organizations to use framing to get their message to the press.
The NIH’s National Cancer Institute published a guide explaining framing and other theoretical
approaches to encouraging positive health behaviors in 2005. The guide explained framing as “a
process in which someone tells the audience what aspect of the story is important,” and that

48

Ibid., 72.
Ibid., 73.
50
Ibid., 72.
51
Ibid., 72-73.
52
John R. Finnegan Jr. and K. Viswanath, “Communication Theory and Health Behavior Change.” in Health
Behavior and Health Education, eds. Karen Glanz, Barbara K. Rimer, and Frances Marcus Lewis (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002) 373.
49
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“public health advocates can use the media to pressure decision makers to develop and support
healthy policies.” 53
Frames of reference have a great influence on human communication—in fact, one could
argue that this concept is the basis of shared meaning. Public relations professionals use framing
to create the frame in which their subject is understood to its best advantage. By evoking certain
images or concepts and/or focusing on certain aspects, whether done overtly or subtly, public
relations activities aim to shape the way their subject is understood by controlling the context.

Framing and Qualitative Content Analysis
Qualitative methods are well suited to exploring and discovering the framing that may lie
hidden in the press releases and press coverage. Several studies examining news releases and/or
press coverage used qualitative content analysis methods. Larsen claimed Kracauer’s 54 argument
that “a text must be received as a meaningful whole, and hence that analysis necessarily involves
an act of interpretation which, like other readings, is based on specific assumptions to be made
explicit in the course of analysis” 55 when he conducted his analysis of fictional media content.
Furthermore, he said the text should be considered an “intersection” of “intentions and possible
effects” and that the researcher’s job was to “bring out the whole range of possible meanings, not
least the ‘hidden’ message of the text.” 56
Gallagher et al. analyzed news releases from before, during, and after Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, examining how different organizations affected by the hurricanes framed their crisis
communications. The authors examined releases from two federal agencies (not including the
53

National Cancer Institute, Theory at a Glance: A Guide for Health Promotion Practice, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, September 2005.
54
See Kracauer (1953), 637.
55
These are Larsen’s words, with the italics preserved.
56
Peter Larsen, “Media Contexts: Textual Analysis of Fictional Media,” A Handbook of Qualitative
Methodologies for Mass Communication Research, Ed. by Klaus Bruhn Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski.
(New York : Routledge, 1991), 121–134.
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CDC) and several U.S. senators and governors representing Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.
They conducted a qualitative content analysis based on the work of Benoit and Coombs,
examining both crisis types and crisis responses.
The authors analyzed how the releases framed the crisis, saying, “In public relations,
framing analysis is often associated with issues management. Further, framing is related to how
public relations practitioners position a story for media coverage.” 57 They, looked at nearly 2000
releases from the organizations chosen, over a roughly six-month period starting a few days
before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the Gulf states. They “examined how the
organizations framed the crises, then…evaluate(d) the effectiveness of those claims.” 58 The
authors coded each news release “to organize the themes,” then developed the theme categories
afterward. The findings showed, among other things, that among the different themes that
emerged, different themes showed differing degrees of neutrality and accusation, but that each
entity in the study attempted to build support for their position. 59
Wester et al. engaged in a sort of immersion technique when they performed a qualitative
content analysis on 53 years of Dutch and German news coverage. They used their study of how
the press in the Netherlands and Germany portrayed each other to develop a “logic for
interpretive content analysis,” 60 which involved reading and re-reading the press clips looking
for different, more detailed meaning in them. They referred to the reading and re-reading as a
“sensitizing concept” 61 that helped them identify frames. When they wanted to focus on a

57

Amanda Hall Gallagher, Maria Fontenot, and Kris Boyle. “Communicating During Times of Crisis: An
Analysis of News Releases From the Federal Government Before, During, and After Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.” Public Relations Review 33 (2007), 218.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid. 218–219.
60
Fred Wester, Alexander Pleijtner, and Karsten Renckstorf, “Exploring Newspapers’ Portrayals: A Logic for
Interpretive Content Analysis,” Communications 29 (2004): 495–513.
61
Ibid., 500.
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particular event, they looked at coverage from one week before the event through one week after
the event. 62
For analyzing frames in a selection of content, Chong and Druckman advocated using
inductive reasoning to identify the frames. They also identified “mass media sources including
major newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and television broadcasts” as common content selected
for such a content analysis. The specifics of the content choices must suit the researcher’s intent,
and “the ‘best’ standard for any particular study may depend on that study’s assumptions and
purpose.” 63 It is the researcher’s job to identify “the presence or absence of one of the predefined
frames in the story or article.” 64
Sometimes content analysis reveals drastically different frames. Perkins conducted a
qualitative framing analysis of NAACP press releases compared to news articles in mainstream
U.S. papers in Florida, in the time immediately following the contested 2000 presidential
election. She concludes that the media framing was so different from the NAACP’s framing that
perhaps the NAACP’s messages were ignored. For her qualitative content analysis, Perkins
obtained the 10 press releases issued during the study period, and searched Lexis-Nexis for
articles from the same time period. From those articles, she took a random sample to analyze.
The articles were read and coded using the frames that emerged during the analysis. 65
The abovementioned authors make a solid case for using qualitative content analysis and
inductive reasoning to explore the issue of framing in PR and the news. They looked at the
evidence, the source material, to identify the framing based on the content of the evidence. I did
the same with my source material, searching it for patterns, uses of certain words (also to be
62

However, this was a longitudinal study, to which this selection method may be more suited.
Ibid., 109.
64
Ibid, 107.
65
Stephynie Chapman Perkins, “Un-presidented: A Qualiative Framing Analysis of the NAACP’s
Public Relations Response to the 2000 Presidential Election.” Public Relations Review 31 (2005): 63–71.
63

17
determined via the analysis); and possibly reading levels, levels of abstraction, and other
qualities.
Press reports represent several different layers of framing. In the cases examined in this
study, the CDC attempted to frame the issues via its press releases. Newspaper reporters framed
the issues when they wrote; their editors may have added their own bit of framing. The various
sources 66 the reporters quoted and the people they interviewed were all chosen because they had
an opinion to offer on the topic—they were all presenting the issue in their own frames. In many
cases, there were conflicts between sources advocating negative (fear) frames and positive
(reassurance and empowerment) frames.
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Significance
The CDC is widely recognized as the premier global public health organization. They
provide an important service toward the greater good. People and governments all over the world
depend on the CDC’s research and information. Improvements to their communication practices
would enable them to better serve people and improve public health.
In this study I examined crisis and risk communication. Health issues involving risk and
crisis require disseminating information of an urgent nature, and these urgent releases will be
more likely to require or invite media attention. A large amount of press coverage for an issue is
significant because the more press coverage an issue or a release receives, the more opportunities
there are for the message to be mediated, and framed in different ways. I chose to study press
releases because they are a purposeful, overt attempt at framing an issue.
Media coverage, including health reporting, is part of a feedback loop in which reported
news affects peoples’ health-information-seeking behavior and news consumption habits, which
again drives news content. Media studies are important to the field of public health; many studies
have shown that people’s interaction with the media affects their health behaviors.67 Likewise,
many studies show that people’s behaviors affect the content of the news. 68 As Martin Meyer
said, whether realistically or cynically, “advertisers like to see heavy newsstand sales; news
judgment at a magazine involves the editor’s decision of what the public wants to buy this
week.” 69
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Chong and Druckman wrote that frames “can affect the attitudes and behaviors of their
audiences.” 70 They also wrote that “conversations about the implications of framing are timely,
as it is commonplace nowadays for polling to be used to test the effectiveness of alternate
methods of presenting policy proposals. To the extent that people do not have independent ideas
on the issues they are being asked to vote on, they can more easily be manipulated by the
framing of proposals….their opinions are vulnerable to being shaped arbitrarily by how the issue
is represented.” 71 Hallahan put it another way: “Critical researchers consider media framing
essentially a tool of power that can be used in the struggle to define whose view of the world will
predominate.” 72
The actions of the CDC’s communications office have the potential to affect numerous
different groups. How, or whether, they choose to act on a particular health issue can have
repercussions for government officials (both elected and appointed), researchers and leaders at
different levels of the CDC, and the CDC as a whole agency. The repercussions for their actions
can be felt at many levels: personal, community, specific population, and the U.S. or global
public as a whole, depending on the issue and the actions taken on that issue. Not only do public
health communications affect the CDC at different levels, it’s seldom transparent to the press or
the public—and sometimes even CDC personnel—who is the source of some of the public health
decisions upon which the communications office must act.
When members or employees of an organization write a press release on behalf of that
organization, they are framing an issue. The purpose of issuing a press release is to provide
information about an issue. However, in doing so, the organization creating the release will
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almost certainly want to frame the issue and discussion about the issue in a manner most
beneficial to itself.
When the media reports on an issue, it is also framing the issue. This can result in similar
frames, but there is the potential for those frames to conflict. If the CDC communication staff’s
messages are misconstrued by the media, or if the CDC’s public relations and health messaging
tactics are ineffective, that such miscommunications pose a potential public health threat. With
the frame defining the issue, and the public’s health at stake, the question of media and PR
framing is an important one. This research adds to the body of knowledge about CDC press
relations, including health communication and press relations.

21

Review of the Literature
Much work has been published in the field of corporate and commercial public relations,
and some in the nonprofit/fundraising sector. The field of public relations research itself,
however, is comparatively young and evolving. 73 Much attention has already been given to
audience research and monitoring in public relations. While the research almost uniformly
espouses the value of doing so, it is also clear from the research that not everyone is doing this,
especially in risk and crisis communications. In other words, the field has a well-documented
best practice that is not being followed in all cases, particularly not when it is needed most.
Like the field of journalism itself, good practices in journalism have been evolving and
changing for hundreds of years. What may have been a good practice in the party press days
would not be considered ethical or professional under today’s ideal of objective journalism.
Currently, journalists are generally expected to be fair, balanced, and to be as objective as
possible. The degree to which they are expected to muckrake, investigate, or toe a party line
varies depending on the environment and the issue. With regard to public relations, though,
running with a press release, and not looking for further information, can be considered lazy.
Health communication, which is, like public relations, an applied communication field, 74
is also a fairly young field. As the field of health communication has evolved, more and more
health communicators have come to realize the power of commercial-style marketing and public
relations strategies and tactics. The CDC even started its own Center for Health Marketing in
2004, 75 with the intent of harnessing the consumer/marketer mindset to “productize” healthy
behaviors and “sell” them to the public. Likewise, the CDC is placing more import on its Office
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of Enterprise Communications and their Division of Media Relations. Their growing body of
research indicates that the CDC is becoming wiser about the possibilities and potential for health
communication and public and media relations. The amount of effort they have put into learning
lessons from their own risk and crisis communications is impressive. While that can—and almost
certainly does—bode well for the health and safety of the public, it also has potential for abuse
considering its situation in a government agency led by political appointees, and considering the
fact that the agency is under constant pressure to maintain its good reputation as a protector of
the public health.
Public relations and health communication were once two fields that appeared unlikely to
intersect. However, in the past 10 or 20 years, interest in both fields has increased, with
theoretical overlap in marketing, risk and crisis communication, and basic conveyance of control,
empathy, or goodwill, as the situation required. Applicable research came from the private
sector, communication researchers, and the CDC, to name a few important sources.

A Brief History of the CDC
The CDC evolved from its single-purpose beginning into its current roles as the world’s
premier global health organization, and as a leader in health communication research. The
agency was founded in 1942 as a small Public Health Service (PHS) department called Malaria
Control in War Areas (MCWA) 76 , and became the Communicable Disease Center (CDC) in
1946. 77 Since that time, the CDC has become a leader in health action and research, including
disease eradication, emerging infectious disease research, biology, chemistry, epidemiology,
disease surveillance, behavior change, and health communication.
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The CDC spent its first two decades defining its purpose and cementing its presence. In
the 1940s, the CDC focused on tropical diseases (both insect-borne and zoological). Its founder,
Dr. Joseph W. Mountin, pushed the organization to expand its reach to include any
communicable disease, with the exceptions of tuberculosis and venereal disease, which already
had their own separate centers. 78 With this expansion, epidemiology became the driving force of
the CDC.
In the 1950s, the CDC’s new force, the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) proved the
CDC’s usefulness and the importance of national public health. EIS members investigated the
possibility of biological warfare during the Korean War, and conducted the surveillance of the
1957 Asian Flu epidemic. 79 Most famously, the EIS also conducted the surveillance that saved
the Salk polio vaccine 80 , thus paving the way for polio to be eradicated in the Western
hemisphere. 81 By the mid-1960s, the CDC was responsible for many more health issues,
including tuberculosis, quarantine, nutrition, and occupational safety. They were also publishing
the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, or MMWR, a weekly publication dedicated to
sharing news of disease research and surveillance.
The CDC changed its name to the Center for Disease Control in 1970, in recognition of
the broadened scope of its public health contributions. In 1977 they (along with the World Health
Organization and other groups) saw the global eradication of smallpox; in roughly the same
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timeframe they discovered the causes of Legionnaires disease and toxic shock syndrome. In June
1981 82 , their MMWR published the first article on the disease that would come to be known as
AIDS. 83
The evolution of the organization’s name continued to reflect its expanding
responsibilities. In 1981 the CDC became the (plural) Centers for Disease Control, and it began
to focus more on collaboration between scientists: epidemiologists, laboratorians, and
statisticians. 84 In the late 1980s and early 1990s the CDC began to embrace prevention as a
priority, conducting large studies of cancer risk factors, and refining scientific methods of both
sentinel surveillance and determining the effectiveness of prevention efforts. 85 To signify their
involvement in these activities, the agency added “and Prevention” in 1992 to arrive at its current
name, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It was at this time, when they began
to see prevention as essential, that the agency began to take health communication seriously.
Despite its original mission of preventing infectious diseases, the CDC has made many
important contributions to the field of health communication. The agency has supported and
conducted research in plain language communication, low literacy, Web usability, communityand culture-specific targeted campaigns, and social marketing. They have three prestigious
public health journals which they make available to the public at no charge; something
previously unheard of. They produce and distribute fact sheets, planning guides, podcasts,
brochures, and numerous other communications materials.
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Legal Authority of the CDC
Creation of the MCWA, as “National Defense Malaria Control Activities,” was
authorized by a 1942 letter from then-Surgeon General Thomas Parran out of interest in
protecting military personnel from malaria during World War II. After the war was over, the
PHS established the Communicable Disease Center; although they secured approval from
Congress, “no formal act of Congress was necessary.” 86 Title 42, “The Public Health and
Welfare,” is the sprawling, evolving piece of legislation that gives the CDC and other federal
health agencies their mandates and authority. 87
The duties of the CDC are largely characterized as being to create and provide research
data, guidelines, and advice on a variety of things, including diseases, conditions, interventions,
implementations, and other public health projects. Much discretion is given to the secretary of
HHS in the exercise of the duties and responsibilities outlined in Title 42. Much of the law states
what HHS (and the CDC) may do rather than what they are to be held accountable for. Many of
the items directed at the CDC are stated thusly: “The Secretary, acting through the Director of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, may (or “shall”) make grants…” 88 Among the
authorities Title 42 specifically grants to the CDC are directing and enforcing foreign
quarantines and collaborating with other agencies on various research projects. 89 The same law
established the National Vaccine Program, with the authority to administer and oversee the safe
procurement and distribution of vaccines, and to direct and guide the CDC and other agencies as
they research and test vaccines. 90 Additional directives and funding are provided by earmarks.
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History of Health Communication at the CDC
The CDC’s own publications, namely the journals Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID),
Preventing Chronic Disease (PCD), and the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR),
are a valuable source of historical information. The MMWR published a supplemental issue in
2006 entitled “60 Years of Public Health Science at CDC.” This issue contained 12 articles, with
each giving an overview of different research areas and other factors as they affect public health,
including epidemiology, veterinary medicine, informatics, laboratory science, and economics. 91
The MMWR is generally highly technical and statistical in nature; however, considering the
important contributions the CDC has made to the field of health communication science, it is
worth noting that such important research was not addressed in their celebratory retrospective.
Courtney et al. described communication is “a relatively new discipline in the field of
public health.” Agencies and other organizations focused their efforts on epidemiology, noncommunication-related prevention efforts (e.g., immunization), and providing scientific
information to health professionals and other scientists. Scientists counted on the press to figure
out what was important, and communicate that information to the public. 92
According to the authors, it was AIDS and other emergent diseases that awakened CDC
to the fact that “communicating clearly to the public was…a necessary component of public
health practice.” 93 In 1993, under agency director William Roper, the CDC formed the Office of
Communication (OC). The OC was responsible for “crafting and delivering messages and
strategies, based on consumer research, to promote the health of individuals and communities.” 94
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The OC’s overarching goal was to build national capacity for health communication efforts by
training the “public health workforce” to communicate effectively. Their primary method of
attaining that goal was through their CDCynergy 95 course 96 , which offers a systematic,
organized way to plan, create, and implement health communications and social marketing
campaigns.
The Anthrax attacks in 2001 called for a quicker response than anything for which
CDCynergy training had prepared people, and the attacks forced CDC to realize that they needed
to broaden their scope when considering whom to train in public health communication. The
Anthrax attacks ushered in a new focus on risk and crisis communication. 97 Their experience led
them to create the ERC (Emergency Risk Communication) CDCynergy training program to
prepare public health officials to respond quickly in time of any crisis that could affect public
health. Courtney et al. worked at the CDC at the time of the article’s authorship, and they
recommended expanding ERC CDCynergy training to include community leaders and local
officials. They said that including a number of local leaders would improve rapport and
communication with the affected community. 98
It appears to have been the mid-1990’s when the CDC started evaluating its own
communication efforts in order to hone them. Nowak 99 and Siska used the “America Responds
to AIDS” (ARTA) public information and AIDS prevention campaign to examine the use of
audience research in the creation and evolution of a public health communication campaign.
According to the authors The CDC was aware that many mass media health campaigns had
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limited success, so they asked the National Academy of Science (NAS) to recommend research
and evaluation approaches for its HIV/AIDS communication activities. The NAS recommended
using formative research to determine which approaches work best, efficacy trials to see if the
campaign could make a difference, process evaluation to find out what information was actually
delivered, and outcome evaluation to determine if the campaign had its desired effects. 100 The
authors describe the process of using these concepts to create, deliver, and evaluate messages.
The authors conclude that a variety of research methods and theoretical frameworks should be
used in a “cycle of research” to develop an effective campaign.
Journal Articles From CDC Publications and Authors
M. Scott Barrett used the CDC’s handling of the 2001 anthrax attacks to study how
message control and spokespersons can affect public reaction. While he said the CDC had
properly applied risk communication theory in disseminating information to doctors, and had
thereby saved lives, he said the entire agency lost credibility in the public’s eyes due to the way
communication was handled during the crisis. He concluded that poor message control, too many
(often conflicting) spokespersons, and poor handling of the ambiguity surrounding this particular
crisis were all mistakes the agency could look to manage during future crises. However, as the
author acknowledged, the anthrax attacks were unlike any other problem the CDC had faced, and
this was identified as a learning opportunity.
Scott Ratzan, editor of the Journal of Health Communication, wrote that despite the
health communicator’s “ethical base to do no harm and advance with scientific integrity and
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humanism,” 101 sometimes erroneous or irresponsible decisions are made in the drive to meet the
rapid-fire needs of today’s news media. He used the case of one 1998 British journal article to
illustrate the devastating consequences these lapses in judgment can cause. In his example, the
lead author of a study claimed that the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine was
associated with autism in children, and campaigned for six years to convince people this was a
fact. After U.S. Institute of Medicine panel conducted a further study, they rejected the British
researcher’s hypothesis. A few years later, an article on the front page of the London Times
uncovered the fact that the researcher had been paid a large sum of money to conduct the
research in support of possible lawsuits from parents who claimed their children had been
damaged by the vaccine. However, despite this revelation, and the retraction by 10 of the original
study’s 13 authors, the perception remains that the vaccine causes autism, and a battle once won
must continue to be fought at the expense of public money and children’s lives. As a result,
Ratzan called for an institutionalization of ethics, values, and critical thinking in health
communication. 102
In “Order out of Chaos,” communication researcher and former director of
communication at CDC Vicki Freimuth described the transition of the CDC to a major health
communication organization. She looked back on her days at the CDC managing the anthrax
crisis response in 2001. She described the challenges of an organization that took pride in its
“slow, thoughtful scientific research” based on “scientific consensus” (142) somewhat suddenly
having to communicate advice, direction, and reassurance based largely on uncertainty. The task
involved (from the abstract) “communicating uncertainty, selecting credible spokespersons,
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collaborating with other organizations, satisfying a competitive 24/7 media, and speed. The
lessons learned in responding to these challenges led to profound changes in the way
communication was organized in the agency. These changes are described within the framework
of chaos theory.” 103
Randolph and Viswanath discussed public health in mass media, and while they did so in
the context of campaigns, there is still a part of the campaign (the PR aspect) that can be
mediated. They reviewed factors that contribute to the success of public health mass media
campaigns 104 including message and health behavior theory, audience research, and
manipulation of the discussion, 105 and how to achieve these things. They suggested that
communicators should exert control over the information environment and the issue itself. While
this article dealt mostly with campaigns and social marketing, these concepts could be applied to
public and media relations.
The CDC’s communication activities before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina became
a case study of the agency’s disaster communication plan. The CDC’s Marsha Vanderford et al.
described in detail a comprehensive disaster communication plan that had been developed over
years of research, then tested and proved in response to SARS, West Nile virus, and three
hurricanes. The CDC had created and distributed messages for a variety of media, in a variety of
languages, to be disseminated under a variety of possible circumstances in a variety of locations
at appropriate phases during the emergency. However, Katrina proved to be an unusually
devastating emergency, and its destruction quickly overwhelmed and short-circuited the CDC’s
communication plans. In addition to describing the CDC’s emergency communication plan, the
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article “address(ed) how lessons derived in the aftermath can be applied to future events, as well
as how CDC’s experience is relevant to health communication research.” 106 Vanderford et al.
used chaos theory in their analysis (as Freimuth had the previous year), concluding that
continued study of emergency response can help communicators see patterns in chaotic
situations, and thereby better anticipate and prepare for the challenges that may arise during an
emergency situation, be it a natural disaster, disease outbreak, or terrorism.
In the same journal issue, Robert S. Littlefield and Andrea M. Quenette used Hurricane
Katrina as a test case to study how the media portrayed authority during a natural disaster. They
conducted a textual analysis of crisis response coverage in two newspapers (the New York Times
and the New Orleans Times-Picayune), and looked at positive and negative representations of
(to quote the abstract) “the military, the Department of Homeland Security, President Bush, the
federal government, and the local government. The findings suggest that the media stepped
outside their role of objective observer and assumed a privileged position to point blame at
legitimate authority. This positioning implicitly empowered the media to evaluate crisis
responses…Understanding how the media create images and depictions can affect how
authorities frame their initial crisis responses.” 107
In the February 2002 issue of the National Communication Association (NCA)’s Spectra
that on October 31, 2001, “ Matthew Seeger reported on a CDC-sponsored national conference
on public health crisis communication, held in conjunction with the NCA conference, which
gathered scholars in “sociology, psychology, and communication as well as representatives from
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the CDC and the Federal Emergency Management Administration.” Their goal was to “establish
a research agenda for crisis communication and the public health.” Discussion about risk
communication focused on audience needs and characteristics, uncertainty, technology, and the
media, among other things. Seeger said the conference had been planned before 9/11 and the
anthrax attacks, and that Barbara Reynolds, the CDC’s director of crisis communication, didn’t
want to limit discussion to those events—that West Nile virus, pandemic avian influenza, and e.
coli outbreaks were also serious threats to consider. He quotes her as saying, “Communication
forms a critical element of the CDC’s response to outbreaks of these and other infectious
diseases.” 108 As much research has been done on corporate and organizational risk
communication, participants called for further research in public health crisis communication
response and audience needs during a crisis.
Seeger discussed best practices in risk communication in the lead article he wrote for a
2006 Journal of Applied Communication Research issue addressing risk and crisis
communication. Seeger recommends ten best practices, building on the findings of an expert
panel, intended to “improve organizational and professional practice.” He also advocated using
these best practices as a grounded-theory approach to crisis communication, “specifically within
the context of large, publicly managed crises.” 109 In the same issue, Robert L. Heath, director of
the Institute for the Study of Issues Management, praised Seeger’s article, attempted to refine the
practices he listed, and added two more best practices to Seeger’s list. He described crisis
response as a narrative that starts with pre-crisis conditions, and said communicators should
commit themselves seriously to being the “first and best source of information” in a crisis. Heath
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described risk as having effects that can have “positive or negative consequences,” and “the
occurrence of which and the effects of which can be variously predicted, controlled, and harmful
or beneficial.” He also described a crisis as “a risk manifested.” 110
Barbara Reynolds, a crisis communication specialist with the CDC, responded to Seeger
and Heath, saying that the idea of best practices is valuable and helpful, but that it would be
easy—and tempting—for everyone with crisis communication experience to continue adding to
the list. Reynolds said that the real objectives of crisis communication are simple and few, and
here she cited the Department of Homeland Security’s 2005 Emergency Planning: National
Response Plan: “prevent further illness, injury, or death; restore calm; and engender confidence
in the operational response.” 111 She said the recipients of the messages have their own set of
objectives regarding recovering from a crisis. By way of finding a use for the ten (or twelve) best
practices, she said that because of the constant availability of a huge variety of information
today, it will be difficult for health communicators to manage communications during the next
outbreak or emergency. Health risk communicators will need to be prepared, and the previously
mentioned best practices would be a good place to start.
David Ropeik, an instructor in risk communication at the Harvard School of Public
Health, added to the conversation, writing that fear and risk perception are the main factors that
cause risk communication to be a special field. Because “evidence suggests that emotion plays a
more powerful role than fact-based analysis 112 ” in shaping a fear response, he argued that risk
perception should be given primacy over other “best practices” in risk/crisis communication
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planning. Ropeik also recommended that risk and crisis communicators constantly monitor the
media, “both to learn what journalists have found and to correct immediately mistakes or
inaccurate information.” 113 He blamed FEMA’s poor response to Hurricane Katrina on their not
following this practice.
David Nelson, a senior scientific advisor with the CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health,
discussed the folly of communicators assuming their information is important without doing the
audience research to find out what the audience wants and needs. In his editorial, “Reducing
Information Pollution in the Internet Age,” which he wrote for the CDC e-journal Preventing
Chronic Disease, he said that the recent availability of low-cost, broad reach communication
technology (e.g., the Internet) may distract communicators from the fundamentals, “such as
understanding the intended audiences and how they seek, assess, and use information.” 114 Nelson
warned against providing too much information, as it tends to confuse and daunt the audience.
He also discussed the “expert heuristic” and how audiences perceive credibility in a message
source.
Elias Arbrutyn commented on a panel discussion on scientific communication for a 1998
special issue of the CDC journal Emerging Infectious Diseases, saying that medical and health
science information was once solely the domain of scientists and physicians, but today a much
broader audience is interested. There is a big difference between what the scientists and the
public know about medicine. He said that “physicians and scientists seek to transmit
information,; the media, on the other hand, seek to entertain in addition to transmitting
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information.” 115 One of the panelists spoke of the advantages of writers putting events in
historical perspective, while another said that “public health professionals cannot see their work
in a historical light.” 116 Arbrutyn recommended that both journalists and scientists consider
historical perspective, both past history, and how the current event or information in question
may factor into history in the future. He continued to say that the media and other writers tasked
with communicating scientific information “may make the scientific community uncomfortable
with probing questions,” but that this questioning adds to the breadth of the perspective in a
positive way. He concluded, “the session’s message was that scientists should view science
writers as the scribes who can disseminate a story to the public by translating technical language
into accessible terms. Scientists, like science writers, should cultivate good sources and pick
stewards who will communicate the information accurately. The world wants to know about
emerging threats to health, and writers can help.” 117
CDC researchers Freimuth, Linnan, and Potter pointed out that communication is an
essential part of public health, and “in the absence of a cure…an effectively crafted and
disseminated prevention message is the key control measure.” 118 The authors wrote about their
application of communication theory to focusing on new infectious disease threats. They authors
characterized past dissemination of health information as scientists “meticulously” recording
study results in scientific journals, leaving the media alone to interpret and transmit scientific
information unaided. The authors identified reasons for heightened concern about effective
messaging, including the increase in public desire for health information, the emergence of new
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diseases, the availability of a variety of information on the Internet, and the aging of the baby
boomers. They called for a theory-based approach to maximize the effectiveness of their health
messaging. They also identified the role of media coverage as to “create awareness…place the
issue on the public agenda, and frame the way the issue is reported.” 119
Lessons Learned From the 2001 Anthrax Communication Response
For what had been a typically isolated government science agency, the anthrax attacks in
2001 were an important turning point at which the CDC became a more public-facing agency.
Liana Blas Winett and Regina C. Lawrence wrote that the anthrax attacks “brought public health
into the media spotlight” and demonstrated to Americans the strength and weaknesses of both the
public health infrastructure and the policies that govern that infrastructure. 120 It was through the
anthrax incident that CDC communications staffers learned the importance of being in control—
for both the physical and mental health of the public.
The Bush administration (including its departments and agencies) was criticized for its
response to the anthrax attacks. The press, the public, and public health and communication
researchers complained that a secretive, slow, uncaring response allowed fear and panic to take
hold of the public. The public felt it had been abandoned by a government that had lost control of
the situation. Fortunately, some lessons were learned quickly, although researchers ruminated
over the response for several years afterward.
Authors from the CDC and elsewhere took advantage of this learning opportunity and
contributed to a special September 2003 issue of the independent, non-CDC-affiliated Journal of
Health Communication dedicated entirely to analyses of various aspects of the CDC’s
communication response to the anthrax attacks. The issue consisted of 24 articles and
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commentaries, including a timeline of the anthrax case (September 18–November 30. 2001) that
had been abstracted from a December 2001 New York Times article. 121 The issue was timed to
coincide with the second anniversary of the attacks.
The Journal’s editor-in-chief Scott C. Ratzan explained the purpose of this special issue
as to analyze the “events and responses to the anthrax scare,” in the context that, in the case of
large-scale emergency events, “ethical decision-making practices based on evidence and reason
have not always followed.” This special issue was also an opportunity to “articulate important
challenges and approaches in our effort to better communicate public health information in
general.” 122 May G. Kennedy, from the Centers for Disease Control’s Office of Communication,
and the guest editor for the special issue, stated that some of the articles were “brief
commentaries from public health professionals ranging from front-line communicators in
affected sites to the then-director of the CDC,” Jeffrey Koplan. Kennedy stated that space
constraints prevented the authors from being able to “develop or provide a great deal of support
for the points they made. The reader is encouraged to go to the literature and websites [sic] they
cite for further documentation.” 123
Vincent T. Covello, the director of the Center for Risk Communication in New York
City, provided a checklist of seven “Best Practices in Public Health Risk and Crisis
Communication,” and guidelines for these best practices. Guidelines included involving
stakeholders, being honest and open, meeting the needs of the media, coordination and
collaboration with other credible sources, and communicating clearly and with compassion. 124
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He stated that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the anthrax attacks “have heightened public health
agencies’ awareness of the need to enhance their risk and crisis communication skills.” He saw
continuing threats of chemical and biological attacks as “a unique opportunity for public health
agencies to assess and elevate their level of communication preparedness for for all risk and
crisis scenarios.”
Polyxeni Potter, who was then, and is as of this writing, the managing editor for the
CDC’s Emerging Infectious Diseases journal, wrote of the importance of the quick response and
turnaround time that is now possible because of the Internet. (Emerging Infectious Diseases is
published both in print and online.) She pointed to the “intentional release of biological agents”
as having “changed the way journal articles are published, just as it has changed the public health
response to outbreak investigations.” While she embraced the technology and the new speed at
which information can be shared with the public, she questioned “how good is fast?” and
cautioned against disseminating information before the time has been taken to ensure that it is
accurate, verifiable, and scientifically valid. She concluded that an article that is published
quickly must only be judged “on the merits of the science and its clinical and public health
usefulness.” 125
Marsha L. Vanderford, who has worked in several important communications capacities
at the CDC, wrote of her experience in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) after the
anthrax attacks in “Communication Lessons Learned in the Emergency Operations Center
During CDC’s Anthrax Response: A Commentary.” She told of an incident in which
doxycyclene was prescribed and distributed to postal workers at risk for anthrax in October
2001; the initiative was met with public outcry because postal workers thought they were
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receiving second-class treatment. It had widely publicized that those in the Hart (senate) building
and at NBC had received Cipro, so even though doxycyclene was equally effective and had
fewer side effects than Cipro, this had not been part of the messaging. They had neglected to
consider the beliefs of their target audience—something that could have been addressed via
messaging—and had considered their message “in isolation” rather than in the context in which
it was received. Vanderford points out that experts have analyzed this and similar situations, and
training has been provided to emergency communicators 126 , but a more reliable solution lies in
constantly applying to risk communication the concepts the communication field has known and
used for years. Even though risk communication is a new field of study, the tried-and-true
research on context and content in messaging remains important.
David A. Shore, an associate dean at the Harvard University School of Public Health,
looked at the importance of trust in health communication (“Communicating in Times of
Uncertainty: The Need for Trust”). He described the basic elements of trust as perceived
competence (“how much one party believes the other party has the required expertise to perform
the agreed-upon duties effectively and reliably”) and perceived conscience (“the extent to which
one party believes that the other party intends to perform its agreed-upon activities and that those
activities really benefit the first party”). 127 Public trust in doctors and the healthcare industry
(Shore refers to the U.S. healthcare system as an “industry” rather than a true unified “system”)
has waned in recent years, and that communication mistakes with the anthrax case were
exemplary of the reasons why this is so. Shore described trust as “a reservoir of goodwill for
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future use,” 128 and that building trust is essential to health communication because the public
isn’t qualified to judge the accuracy and importance of public health communications.
Sandra Mullin, associate commissioner and director of communications at the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, wrote of the merits of what she termed the
“Giuliani Press Conference Model” of risk communication. Mullin described this as seemingly
frequent press conferences post 9/11 in which New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, “flanked by
other officials, stood clearly at the helm, displaying both empathy and mastery over information.
As risk communication expert Peter Sandman would say, the mayor helped the city cope with the
unbearable by bearing it himself.” 129 She further described the sense of trust he was able to build
during the aftermath of 9/11, and how this trust was useful during the anthrax case. She also
credited a barrage of communications to different stakeholders, including an up-to-date Web site
and rapid creation and broadcast of fact sheets and broadcast faxes. Finally, she said that learning
from past risk communication mistakes was critical, as that was how they learned the hard lesson
of how important it is to not dismiss the public’s fears as “illegitimate.”
In “Uncertain Science and Certain Deadlines: CDC Responses to the Media During the
Anthrax Attacks of 2001,” Robinson and Newstetter, researchers from the Georgia Institute of
Technology, studied 19 communication professionals who worked on the CDC response to the
anthrax attacks. According to the abstract, “the interviews sought CDC staff viewpoints on how
the CDC handled a historically unprecedented level of press activity…Staff reported that the
situation led to new work practices, tools for performing the work, and an enhanced
understanding of what it takes to be prepared for and to handle communication work during a
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terrorism-related health crisis.” 130 The authors believed these lessons can be applied by CDC and
other public health organizations to future crisis communication initiatives.
CDC authors Prue et al. discussed CDC’s media monitoring system in “Communication
Monitoring: Shaping CDC’s Emergency Risk Communication Efforts.” The CDC’s monitoring
system enables the agency’s Office of Communication to monitor news media outlets for
coverage of CDC issues. The CDC also uses the system to create and refine messages by
identifying information gaps and opportunities. This system was expanded after 9/11 and the
anthrax attacks “into a broader communication monitoring system, with both listening and telling
functions, to support CDC’s public health emergency response” (abstract). 131 The article also
described day-to-day activities in the Office of Communication, and the actual experience of
monitoring communications during a public health emergency.
Mebane et al. compared CDC information releases and press coverage on the anthrax
attacks for similarities or differences. The authors conducted a quantitative analysis of CDC
information compared to media coverage in “Communicating Anthrax in 2001: A Comparison of
CDC Information and Print Media Accounts.” The authors sampled and coded two months of
news media and used statistical analysis to compare it to information released by CDC. They
also conducted an in-depth, qualitative analysis of two anthrax-related issues. According to the
abstract, “the quantitative analysis showed that, overall, the CDC information releases and the
news coverage tracked fairly closely.” However, “the in-depth qualitative analysis showed that
some reporters misinterpreted information provided by CDC but they responded to requests to
clarify the issue. The findings of this study suggest(ed) ways to improve future crisis
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communication efforts and demonstrate how differing methods of analysis can yield
substantially different results.” 132
Robert Blendon et al., in “Using Opinion Surveys to Track the Public’s Response to a
Bioterrorist Attack,” recommended that public health communicators use surveys to determine
“what Americans know and believe, whom they trust, and what actions they are taking in
response to the crisis.” 133 They argued that the military and the media have used them to their
benefit, as have organizations that conduct exit polls during elections, and that public health
should take advantage of them as well. The authors said the survey results would help facilitate
two-way communication, and could help guide officials and public health communicators during
a crisis.
William Pollard, of the CDC’s Office of Communication, also described surveys as a
gauge of public opinion. He compared the data from national surveys before and after the
anthrax attacks, and found that periodic attitude and opinion surveys can “provide timely,
important information for understanding audiences in communication planning.” From the
abstract, “the findings highlighted the importance of local television and radio and of cable and
network news as information sources.” 134
Rudd, et al. (2003) said communication is one of the most important tools to protect
public health. In their case studies on specific, urgent government health communication
campaigns (AIDS in 1988 and anthrax in 2001), they explored the specific challenges of risk
communication. Risk communication usually comes with a much shorter timeline than a long132
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term campaign, and therefore presents special challenges with regard to planning, design,
writing, and implementation. The authors explained basic health communication concepts such
as literacy and risk, later going into more detail about the special considerations of risk
communication. Despite the similarities in the situations addressed in these case studies, there
were differences between the situations of their development: level of immediacy, time frame,
and amount of pretesting. The authors find the AIDS piece to be much better tailored to the
audience, the most important factor being that this piece considers the audience much more than
does the anthrax piece. The authors maintain that plain language (and testing to help get the
language right) is extremely important in risk communications.
Parker and Gazmararian wrote of the importance of health literacy, which is the ability to
not simply read, but comprehend, health information. They agreed with Rudd’s article in the
same journal issue, but believe that plain writing isn’t enough—efforts must be made to boost the
public’s understanding of health information. They also provided statistics by way of explaining
that “the people with the greatest health care needs in our country have the least ability to
comprehend information required to successfully navigate and function in our health care
system.” 135
Zaracadoolas et al. furthered the Parker and Gazmararian argument, quoting an esoteric,
scientific passage describing anthrax bacteria as an example of the typically too-scientific
anthrax information available to the public. They claim that many opportunities to communicate
about the threat in a useful manner were lost because communicators were not working from an
adequate, uniform definition of health literacy. They offered their own definition of health
literacy as “the evolving skills and competencies needed to find, comprehend, evaluate, and use
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health information and concepts to make educated choices, reduce health risks, and improve
quality of life.” 136 They advocated use of this definition in order to make the public more health
literate, and therefore increase the effectiveness of health communications.
Jamieson et al., of the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School, raised some
questions about the propriety of journalistic reporting of details and hypotheticals in the case of
terrorist attack. Among the questions they said journalists 137 should ponder is whether to report
information that terrorists could use, and when is it responsible to report hypothetical
information. In response, they provided a list of questions they can use to determine whether
information needs to be reported. 138
Payne and Schulte focused on the fact that much of the health information the public
receives is mediated, and that the goals of the mass media and health communicators are not
always the same. They can be valuable partners or “forceful foes.” The authors referred to a
perpetuation of misinformation and mistrust in the aftermath of the anthrax attacks, which the
authors said could have been avoided if public health officials, namely the surgeon general, had
shown adequate leadership. As for the media, the authors said “people providing information to
the public have a responsibility to report accurate health information, especially in the event of
an emergency,” and to that end, proposed a set of ethics, training, and cooperation goals for the
U.S. government, public health officials, and the media. 139
Kay Golan, who was the director of the CDC’s Media Relations department during the
anthrax attacks offered advice on “Surviving a Public Health Crisis.” She advised
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communicators to plan and practice taking care of yourself, the work, family—everything—in
case of a public health crisis. She said to build relationships now that communicators can use in
case of an emergency. No matter how disruptive the emergency, the public will still count on the
officials and their organizations for the same things they always have, so the organization’s core
functions should be recognized and adhered to. She said that the public will want to know, and
they have a right to; that the media will constantly want updates, and they have a right to that
too. Response to these needs should be planned in advance of an emergency, because being
timely and accurate is difficult.
Courtney et al. described communication is “a relatively new discipline in the field of
public health,” but that CDC has created and implemented training programs for emergency risk
communication (such as CDCynergy). Agencies and other organizations focused their efforts on
epidemiology, non-communication-related prevention efforts (e.g., immunization), and providing
scientific information to health professionals and other scientists. Scientists counted on the press
to figure out what was important, and communicate that information to the public. According to
the authors, it was AIDS and other emergent diseases that awakened CDC to the fact that
“communicating clearly to the public was…a necessary component of public health practice.” 140
In 1993, under agency director William Roper, the CDC formed the Office of Communication
(OC). The OC was responsible for “crafting and delivering messages and strategies, based on
consumer research, to promote the health of individuals and communities.” 141 The OC’s
overarching goal was to build national capacity for health communication efforts by training the
“public health workforce” to communicate effectively. Their primary method of attaining that
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goal was through their CDCynergy course 142 , which offers a systematic, organized way to plan,
create, and implement health communications and social marketing campaigns.
However, the Anthrax attacks in 2001 called for a quicker response than anything for
which CDCynergy training had prepared people. This forced CDC to realize that they needed to
broaden their scope when considering whom to train in public health communication. The
Anthrax attacks ushered in a new focus on risk and crisis communication. 143 Their experience
led them to create the ERC (Emergency Risk Communication) CDCynergy training program to
prepare public health officials to respond quickly in time of any crisis that could affect public
health. Courtney et al. worked at the CDC at the time of the article’s authorship, and they
recommended expanding ERC CDCynergy training to include community leaders and local
officials. They said that including a number of local leaders would improve rapport and
communication with the affected community. 144
Salmon et al. wrote of a survey intended to assess Michigan corporate spokespersons’
awareness of and preparedness for a bioterrorism attack. The survey was begun on September
10, 2001 and continued through October 2001 (the first anthrax attack occurred on September
18), and is therefore described as providing an “unusually timely snapshot” of bioterrorism
awareness. According to the article abstract, “the results offer evidence of a robust optimistic
bias” as well. The authors warned that this optimistic bias could result in corporate America 145
overestimating its level of preparedness. 146
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Jeffrey Koplan, who was the director of the CDC at the time of the anthrax attacks, but
who had left for Emory University by the time this journal issue was published, wrote a brief
commentary on “Communication During Public Health Emergencies.” He focused on the
similarities and differences between communication during a personal health emergency and a
public health crisis. He pointed out that when a person is in an automobile accident, for example,
there is a team of medical professionals focusing on the needs of that one person, and the
victim’s family does not necessarily expect a constant stream of information from the medical
team. On the other hand, in a modern public health crisis, millions of people expect a continuous
flow of information from the health officials. Koplan said the latter was not previously the case,
and he said that it was the 2001 anthrax attacks that caused this shift in the relationship between
the public and health officials. Audiences and their roles are now more diverse and complex; this
combined with the constant judgment calls, the volume of information, and the variety of media
used to communicate this information can make communicating public health information quite
a challenge.
Peter Sandman, a risk communication consultant who acted as an advisor to the CDC
during the anthrax response, wrote that while he found the issue’s previous 22 articles to be
useful and practical, he was struck by the lack of focus on policy. He worried that the “tough
communication policy questions tend to get subordinated to the important but not-so-painful
logistical and procedural ones.” 147 He continued to say that it is tempting to believe “that once
the scientists have decided what is happening and what to do about it, all we communication
folks need to do is get the word out.” 148 Communication professionals have more work to do
than that, and more work to do than message tailoring, monitoring, and similar aspects of the
147
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communication field. He said there is a real policy debate that still needs to occur in order for
health communicators to be truly prepared.
The “Epilogue to the Special Issue on Anthrax” was provided by Vicki Freimuth. She
called for continued dialogue, and said “communication is no panacea for terrorist health threats,
but effective communication can help minimize the damage done in this kind of crisis and
mobilize preparedness efforts.” 149

Review of Public Relations and Risk/Crisis Communication Literature Written by
Non-CDC Authors
Communication researchers Carl H. Botan and Maureen Taylor reviewed the foundation
and current state of theoretical public relations research, noting that the field itself is relatively
young at 25 years 150 . They also noted that although it has its own distinct body of work as a
subfield of communication studies, (as the abstract stated) “(t)he field of public relations is
developing into a theoretically based area of applied communication that has the potential to
inform several areas of communication/mass communication and to offer theoretic and
conceptual tools useful in health, risk, and political communication, among others.” 151 Botan and
Taylor wrote of the purely functional beginnings of public relations research, saying that the
field is evolving “to a perspective that focuses on communication as a meaning-making process,”
a dialogue, in which the audience plays an active part.152 The authors also discussed the idea that
issues do not simply appear suddenly, but that they have a relatively predictable life cycle that
can be managed to some degree.
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Then-executive vice president and general manager of American Newspaper
Representatives, Inc., Warren Grieb told the Georgia Press Institute in 1963, that public relations
is “personal selling—personality, promotion, publicity, communications, utilization of all
resources, both human and otherwise, to further and enhance a better image of a product, service,
company, or group of companies, in the eyes of the public.” 153 He told them, “Select your
personnel carefully, especially the ones who meet the public. Their personality, their warmth,
their friendliness, their willingness to help, their dress, and their appearance have…much to do
with creating a favorable impression…” 154
Media advocacy is a concept tied closely to public relations. One way to look at it is that
organizations in power use public relations to relate to the public. The public, via grassroots
and/or community-based organizations, can use media advocacy as a tool to influence how the
powerful organizations wield that power. The CDC certainly engages in public relations, but its
programs also encourage grassroots activism and media advocacy to enable communities to meet
their local public health goals. Also, though the CDC is powerful, it relies on policymakers for
its funding and mandates, and at times clearly attempts to influence them, and to influence their
public to influence the policymakers as well.
Lawrence Wallack described the purpose of media advocacy (at least in a public health
setting) as being “to use the media strategically to apply pressure for changes in policy to
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promote public health goals.” 155 He also said media advocacy provides a “framework” for
shifting the discussion from the health consequences of individual behaviors to the health
implications of policy and environment. 156 These effects are similar to the ones seen in episodic
and thematic framing.
Michael Palenchar and Robert Heath summarized the evolution and current sate of risk
communication research, describing risk communication as a collaborative process. Their 2007
article was written from the perspective of preparedness for terrorist threats to infrastructure, of
risk caused by long-term environmental damage, and of risk related to living near or working at a
hazardous materials facility. These all fall under the umbrella of public health concerns, and
share much in common with health risk communication. Palenchar and Heath shared their
insights gained from a decade of research in the field, including that “ideas and meaning count;”
transparency is important to effective relationships and requires active participation by
stakeholders; collaboration is essential to building trust; uncertainty is a reality risk
communicators must endure; risk communications are part of a dialogue (with the public and
other stakeholders) and a narrative; and risk communications help inform a functioning society
to make decisions. The authors said risk communication should not have public relations as its
objective, nor should it attempt to simply reassure the public. Risk communication, they said,
should be approached as a “constructive dialogue that legitimately addresses risk assessment,
abatement, policy, and communication.” 157 Lastly, the authors said that risk communication is
easier to plan than it is to implement.
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Journalist and author Madeline Drexler wrote specifically about problems with getting
information from the CDC’s leadership, researchers, and spokespeople, which, she said, in preSeptember 11 times, was much easier to do. Writing in 2003, she said, “in order to converse with
someone at the CDC, a reporter must now make a formal request, which can take weeks to be
processed through a complex public affairs filtration system that reaches all the way
to…Washington, D.C.” 158 She asked whether the huge increases in preparedness funding were
actually improving what she described as “the daily, unpublicized tide of disease,” including the
spread of West Nile virus, antibiotic-resistant microbes, contaminated poultry, and vaccinepreventable diseases, in addition to bioterrorism. She then asked, in five years, “if journalists are
still struggling just to talk with authorities in the know, how will the public ever find out” if real
improvements have been made? 159
Sooyoung Cho used a survey of health public relations professionals to study power
relationships in public relations; he said that much attention had already been paid to the “great
power…granted to the mass media in terms of selecting and framing messages…However,
because of the complex nature of the subject and the need for specialized expertise, the health
beat is one in which reporters rely on a source’s expertise and public relations efforts.” 160 This
reliance, coupled with the relationships health PR practitioners frequently develop with health
beat reporters, often gives the health PR practitioners “expert power.” Cho recommended, among
other things, further qualitative research and content analysis of the news coverage the health
organizations receive.
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Cho and Cameron furthered Cho’s earlier study of power in public relations, this time
using a survey to examine four factors that effect the perception of expert power: “personal
closeness with reporters, openness towards (sic) the media, perceived media job performance,
and perceived expertise in the health field.” 161 Cho’s review of the literature indicated that
“public relations practitioners appear to play an important role in health news reporting as a
mediator between journalists and scientific fields such as medicine.” 162
Scott Ratzan, editor of the Journal of Health Communication, wrote an editorial in 2003
about the communication challenge presented (mainly to the World Health Organization, or
WHO) by the SARS outbreak. Ratzan empathized with the WHO for the challenges they faced
as they had to determine how best to “place SARS in perspective by exhibiting clear concern,
caution, and the means for controlling the spread of SARS” 163 while also trying to control the
spread of the fear. Ratzan pointed out that when the public focuses on the wrong thing, they
divert their attention from, and communicators are forced to divert resources from, other threats
that are more constant or deadly, such as “HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, and diarrheal disease.” For
the obstacles to effective health communication, Ratzan blamed both the profusion of unofficial
and/or mediated sources, including members of the public itself, and “the growing lack of public
trust in experts (particularly scientists), policy-makers, and politicians.” 164 Ratzan also said that
the public often erroneously blames the messengers for the mistakes of the public officials and
experts. To solve this, Ratzan proposed that health communicators tailor their information for
certain specific audiences, including the general public, patients, and caregivers.
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Veil et al. wrote of factors affecting the public relations work done in response to the
hepatitis A outbreak that sickened 660 people at a Pennsylvania Chi-Chi’s restaurant. As if the
health crisis were not bad enough, Chi-Chi’s had to maintain an appearance of legitimacy,
character, and competence in the face of the additional fact that its parent company had declared
Chapter 11 bankruptcy shortly before the outbreak was traced to Chi-Chi’s. The authors stated
that Chi-Chi’s demonstrated competence—they had passed their recent health inspections with a
score of 100, and they reassured the public that the outbreak hadn’t extended beyond that one
Chi-Chi’s restaurant. However, the company didn’t demonstrate the character (empathy, regret,
compassion, and concern) that the victims wanted. Veil et al. recommend a crisis communication
plan to ensure effective communications in case of a crisis, and that a “balanced mixture of
competence and character ” can help a company regain its legitimacy. 165
Much research concludes that applying plain language principles is an effective way to
eliminate potentially confusing scientific and medical jargon, and make health information
available to the public. Kickbush and Ratzan cited an estimate of $73 billion lost annually to low
health literacy, including the consequences of misunderstanding patient information. 166 But
rather than focusing on the concept of literacy in general, which connotes more responsibility on
the part of the reader, they concluded that the federal government should work harder to reach
the public. Factors such as embarrassment and information overload interfere with the
consumer’s attainment of health literacy skills. Kickbush and Ratzan also found fault in a general
lack of systematic response to issues that can be construed to fall outside the responsibilities of
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one government agency or another. They also faulted a lack of awareness of the positive
economic impact of a health-educated public.
Rudd and Kaphingst, et al., used their case study on federally-mandated clean water
information, to document and examine a health literacy team’s process of rewriting this
information. They provided methods (multiple, to make up for deficiencies in existing methods)
and an explanation of the steps used in the rewriting process, in order that it may serve as a guide
for others. They conclude that the case was successful, and that public health researchers and
practitioners should take responsibility and look to the commercial sector for ideas. 167
Genova interviewed Jason Kravitz, the communications director of Direct Relief
International, an international relief agency, discussing internal and external communication
strategies developed by that agency for disaster response. The author was mainly interested in
the business communications applications and similarities, but many of the concepts and
practices Kravitz described are applicable to any kind of emergency or risk communication. He
talked about the writing process, communication structure, and command chain used in getting
messages to their target populations. 168
Tanner said the proliferation of health news today is in response to “the appetite of media
consumers.” 169 This increases the pressure and burden on public health communicators and
media relations staff, who, she said, are familiar with the fact that many of their stories never
make it to print (or the air, or the Internet); the messages that do get picked up by the news media
are often misinterpreted or distorted. These distortions, in turn, lower the credibility of the health
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information the public receives from the media. Turner conducted a study that found that the
media were uneducated in the health, medicine, and science fields upon which they were
reporting. This lack of knowledge, combined with the pressure to fill much time with health
news, contributed to reliance on the community for health news sources. Turner recommended
that media relations professionals form relationships with these community health sources, and
provide community members and experts to provide interesting examples and interview subjects
for stories. Further, Turner recommended that media relations professionals think in terms of
providing sound bites and being mindful of reporters’ deadlines.
In Public Relations Quarterly’s “Superstar PR” column, Ronald Levy wrote about
organizations creating and preserving public goodwill, and protecting the public health at the
same time, by actively providing health information (specifically that which is beneficial to the
organization) to the media. Examples he provided include Microsoft sharing information about
their corporate fitness program, and GlaxoSmithKline “helping the public beat a serious ailment
many people don’t know about.” 170 Further, Levy said, some organizations have enjoyed success
with “preventive PR,” distributing press releases that attempt to frame emerging issues as they
emerge, and steer the discussion in a direction beneficial to their organization. Levy
recommended organizations seek opportunities to conduct such PR activities whenever possible,
to encourage “an outpouring of public gratitude” 171 and “make the public less critical of an
organization.” 172
Coombs, who has written several books on crisis communication, focused mainly on
corporate crises, but his principles can be applied to risk and crisis communication from any
organization. In Ongoing Crisis Communication, he addresses crisis communication from
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assessing risks and pre-crisis planning to sensing potential crisis situations, all the way through
the execution of a crisis response. Among the important points he made is to identify multiple
spokespeople and train them before any hint of a crisis, 173 to create a crisis response plan, 174 to
rehearse the crisis response, and to refine the response plan based on lessons learned when
conducting the rehearsal. 175 Coombs described crisis communication as being reflexive:
responders should monitor the media response to their crisis response. He also provided a section
on determining which situations called for which communication response strategy, e.g.,
apology, denial, excuse, or attack. 176
Several years later, Coombs, along with co-author Sherry Holladay published It’s Not
Just PR, which discussed public relations from a variety of perspectives. Rather than explaining
the “how-to” of the public response, the authors explored issues such as common critiques of
public relations, ethical responsibilities of public relations, public relations in academia, the
evolution of the field, and how public relations affects society—often undetected. Among the
ideas they discussed is public relations as public communication, which therefore has ethical
responsibilities to serve both the client and the public. 177

A Review of Journalistic Best Practices
Good public health journalism is good journalism. The specifics may differ between a
health beat and another, like sports or city government beats, but the basics of good reporting are
the same no matter what the subject. Walter Grieb, a PR professional, offered what he considered
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a best practice for the members of the press. He said that readers come from every demographic,
but what they have in common is that “they look to you, believe in you, and rely on you for a full
reporting of all the news” 178
Public Health journalism
The best health reporters aren’t necessarily scientists, but reporters who rigorously follow
the best practices of their own craft of journalism. Lewis Cope, a former science reporter and
former president of the National Association of Science Writers, said that reporters didn’t need
to be experts on the “scientific answers,” but that “their job obligates them to ask the right
questions.” 179 He discussed how “tricky” it can be to be clear when reporting medical research
findings, but that it is important, and that journalists have a public health duty to inform the
public. 180 He said reporters should employ the “journalistic instincts” of “healthy skepticism and
good questioning” 181 both to avoid being led astray, and to avoid misleading news consumers.
Cope listed a number of recommendations to help medical reporters avoid common
pitfalls. He said reporters should feel free to use findings from less rigorous studies if they seem
important, but they must question the meaning of those findings. 182 He pointed out that average
figures don’t always provide an accurate portrayal of a situation and that costs of treatment and
medication are important to readers. 183 He also said that when research findings disagree with
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current scientific knowledge and assumptions, this can be important, but that there is a huge
burden that must be met when changing the scientific status quo. 184
Cope further warned that numbers can mislead both reporters and the public. He
specifically referred to the ongoing debate over the causes of autism to make his point that “even
with impressive numbers, association doesn’t prove causation.” 185 He admonished reporters who
speculate that vaccines cause autism, saying that their lack of thoroughness and lack of
adherence to journalistic best practices may result in unnecessary illness and death, as parents
may delay having their children immunized based on what they read in the news. He said that in
these stories, “the missing figures are the tolls these childhood diseases took before vaccines
were available.” 186 While he acknowledged that sometimes small numbers can tell a big story, he
also said that “(r)eaders…should also know that science looks at the statistical probability of
what’s true. Few, if any, new treatments would ever reach patients if proof-positive were
required. Many, many lives would be lost.” 187
Uncertainty is a given in research—otherwise there would be no research to conduct—
and Cope encouraged reporters to help set proper expectations for the understanding of scientific
information. He recommended that reporters “remind readers about the certainty of some
uncertainty.” 188 He gave changing nutrition standards as an example of a research area news
consumers find particularly frustrating, and said that “(i)n the eyes of some, these and other flipflops give science a bad name. Actually, this is science working just as it is supposed to work,
and it helps if we, as reporters, include this in our stories.” 189 Health and medical reporters need
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to remind readers that science has not failed simply because researchers don’t know all of the
answers yet.
Having been both a medical reporter and a practicing medical doctor, Perri Klass has
experienced both sides of the doctor-journalist relationship. She wrote about some of the issues
medical reporters face, including lack of training and editorial pressure to make a story more
interesting or compelling by conflation, exaggeration, or even killing off a patient. 190 She also
discussed the need to protect patient privacy and confidentiality, which may require drastically
changing a patient’s identifiable attributes. (While this is probably necessary, doing so would
theoretically interfere with the truth of a story.)
Klass said that “everyone brings to the job a complex mix of prejudice and experience
and the desire to tell a good story, along with a set of standards.” 191 She acknowledged that she
admired journalistic ideals of “pure freedom and objectivity,” 192 and that the label of “reputable
medical journalist…carries a specific conscious and conscientious identity” 193 that she
sometimes “inhabited.” However, she said she found the diagnostic judgment—the
subjectivity—of a doctor to be useful in journalism, and that it is possible to embrace that and
make it part of the story.
Medical editor Ragnar Levi said that medical reporters should probe, verify, and
generally “work to separate scientific fact from science fiction.” 194 Levi described a number of
common pitfalls, including failure to ask sources to fully explain findings and numbers or
substantiate evidence, resorting to “he-said-she-said” accounts, assuming research results
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directly affects clinical practice, and under- or overstating risk. 195 He acknowledged certain
pressures reporters face, including the temptation to report on unusual cases and deadline
pressures. 196
Levi said that in-depth scientific knowledge is not necessary for good medical
reporting—but that a few other things were, namely, “basic knowledge of a few scientific ground
rules,…common sense, and a whole lot of healthy skepticism.” 197 He recommended “four key
questions” to guide reporters to the real answers: “Is the claim valid? Where is the evidence? Is
the evidence strong and relevant? How can the news be reported fairly and accurately?” 198
Knowing where to find additional research sources quickly can help a reporter avoid mistakes
caused by deadline pressures, and reporters can avoid misleading the public by noting when a
case is unusual. 199 Further, he recommends that journalists question a source’s ability to make an
expert claim, the reliability of the methods, and whether the source stands to gain from the
publicity that may result from news coverage.200 Like Cope, he points out that “correlation is not
causation.” 201
Recommendations on best practices for journalists are important, but some
recommendations, like proper training, may be out of reach even for the journalists that want to
follow them. Melinda Voss had been a reporter for 26 years before pursuing a master’s degree in
public health, and while in school she was dismayed to hear her professors harshly criticize
health journalists and their stories for being “careless, unscientific, inadequate, or unfair.” 202
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Voss agreed that an untrained health press can “wreak havoc” and confuse the public 203 because
research repeatedly shows that the public relies heavily on the media for health information. 204
She said press coverage at an early stage of an unfolding health issue or of research on a health
topic may mislead the public into believing that “the data are in fact mature, the methods valid,
and the findings widely accepted.” 205
However, she mentioned “how little preparation and on-the-job-training journalists
typically receive” for covering complex medical issues, and that these journalists “know they
lack proficiency and want help.” 206 She cited a survey she had conducted of 115 Midwestern
health journalists, with 83% of respondents stating they had received no training at all
specifically pertaining to reporting on health issues. 207 Furthermore, “more than twothirds…identified four skills—understanding key health issues, putting health news in context,
producing balanced stories on deadline, and interpreting statistics—as troublesome.” 208
Unfortunately, accurate, effective health journalism requires a specialized skill set, and
reporters are unlikely to receive the training they need to obtain these skills. Voss said that unlike
reporters on other beats, health reporters “need skills and knowledge not easily acquired on the
job.” 209 However, she said newspapers spend very little on professional development when
compared with other industries, providing less training than the journalists want or need. 210
Additionally, she said the available training programs may be inadequate; few programs address
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“such journalism fundamentals as how to interview health and medical researchers or how to
report medical research,” and the existing programs could benefit from outside evaluation. 211
Additional recommendations to journalists from medical and health professionals include
more coverage of the health care system and health policy environment, 212 more in-depth,
thoughtful coverage of complex issues such as the state of U.S. health insurance, 213 and—
surprisingly—that journalists demand more out of health researchers. 214 Mebane said journalists
and researchers should get together and “discuss what news the public wants to and needs to
know,” and that such conversations could lead to better reporting and increased cooperation from
the experts. Mebane said that “journalists provide a valuable service to the public” by reporting
on health issues and the health system, as they provide the most effective means of
communicating such important information. 215
Journalistic Best Practices With Regard to Public Relations
Even if they don’t collaborate to the degree Mebane suggested, public health officials and
their public relations staffs need to recognize the benefits of a relationship with the press, or at
least the importance of getting coverage on important health issues. The press helps public health
communicators get their message out in an effective, economical way (although sometimes the
information in a press release can be changed drastically in the resulting article). The very fact
that the message is mediated, rather than coming straight from a government spokesperson, can
often lend needed credence to a message. Press coverage can also help raise awareness of an
issue to the point that the message source, or the agency that can address the issue—both of
211
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which can describe the CDC in the case of a public health issue—can benefit from additional
funding, power, and visibility.
Journalists and public relations practitioners have long had a troubled, yet symbiotic,
relationship. Herbert Strentz, a journalism professor and veteran reporter, said that tradition
holds that public relations “conjures two mental images for veteran reporters: the press release
and the waste basket.” However, Strentz said the reality is that public relations provides a
“subsidy of information” that the reporters appreciate and use. 216 He acknowledged that despite
the usefulness of reporters and PR personnel to each other, the relationship harbors some distrust.
While PR personnel help journalists fill their need for information, journalists also know they are
being “used” to some extent. Additionally, reporters may receive inaccurate or incomplete
information from PR personnel, or they may harbor a grudge for telephone calls and emails
never returned (or returned too late for deadline),217 being kept waiting for interviews, or not
being given access to the people the reporter thinks are important or appropriate for a story.
Strentz further described why the relationship is this way, saying, “relatively few news
reporters think of public relations in terms of the Public Relations Society of America,” which
puts great effort into education, accreditation, disclosure, and improving industry standards, but
that they are “likely to remember…the corporate president hiding poor earnings in the last
paragraph of a four-page news release, or the public relations director who denied a merger just
hours before it was formally announced.” 218
Edward Lordan claims that part of the reason Americans currently have a negative view
of public relations is that the Bush administration contributed greatly to this blurring of lines, and
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that the public and the press have both become wary of it. He cites $250,000,000 spent on public
relations efforts in four years, granting press access to non-journalistic party supporters, the
video news release (VNR) scandal, and paying press members to support the administration’s
positions and actions. However, rather than laying all the blame at the feet of the Bush
administration, Lordan admonished both the public relations practitioners and the press members
involved for their participation, especially in the latter example, saying that both the Public
Relations Society of America (PRSA) as well as “every responsible media organization in
America” have codes of ethics that forbid these actions. “You don’t pay to get stories placed, and
you don’t accept payments to place them.” 219
Lordan said there were several reasons for the blurred lines between public relations and
the press: they work with similar methods, tools, jargon, and deadlines, and work closely and
often in a symbiotic sort of relationship. However, he said that maintaining a clear separation
between the two was essential to the credibility of both fields. He delineated their roles thusly:
“The role of the public relations professional is to help his or her client develop and sustain
relationships with key publics by presenting the most favorable, but still completely truthful,
information. The role of the press is to report what is going on to help keep the public
informed.” 220
Karla K. Gower described different aspects of the relationship between reporters and
public relations workers. She said that journalists often view themselves as watchdogs of
established institutions and as protectors of the underdog. “By adopting the watchdog metaphor,”
she wrote, “the media put themselves into an adversarial position vis-à-vis the institutions of
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government, business, and in some cases, religion.” 221 Gower said that while journalists felt
hampered by businesspeople lying or telling half-truths; businesspeople felt reporters were out to
get them. 222 Gower noted that some corporations retaliated against what they felt was negative
coverage, boycotting some papers and taking out full-page ads in others to get their versions of a
story out. 223 Martin Meyer of the Harvard Business School described the adversarial relationship
another way: “In the end the essence of reporting is finding out what the players wish to keep
secret, and why, and what the secrets mean.” 224
However, Meyer acknowledged that the relationship was symbiotic, saying “government
badly needs the attention of the news purveyors.” 225 “in the absence of news it would be difficult
for people to find out what the government is doing, and impossible for them to find out what the
government thinks it is doing.” However, he described “the symbiosis between press and
government” as “deeply troubled.” 226
Authors featured in the Spring and Summer 2003 volumes of the Nieman Report
appeared to agree on best practices for health and medical beat reporters. They presented these
practices as well as tips for reporters, public relations organizations, and even news consumers in
their articles. Several of the authors also agreed that training for health and medical reporters was
important, but lacking.
Some best practices came from journalists who worked with public health officials on
stories. Sanjay Bhatt, the Palm Beach Post’s lead reporter on the anthrax attack story in 2001,
shared lessons learned from his experience. He recommends paying attention, investigating, and
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storing information so that reporters have information and context on which to ask questions of
official sources if or when a disaster strikes. In his words, “plan ahead of the event, as you would
for a natural disaster.” 227 He pointed out the uncertainty when addressing a potential bioterrorism
incident and implored reporters to “do your job, but don’t be reckless,” rushing onto a scene
without considering that the undetermined agent could also sicken reporters and make them
unwitting parts of the story. 228 His recommendation with regard to official statements was to
report them, “then explain what they don’t say.” 229
Bhatt also wrote of the pressures that can drive a reporter to resort to non-expert sources.
Using the example of the anthrax attacks, he describes “the pressure to feed readers fresh angles”
as “unrelenting,” even when there were no new developments to report. 230 He lamented that
coverage of atypical stories, like unusual drug reactions to the Cipro people at risk were taking,
may have unnecessarily frightened people away from preventive measures, but defends his
decision to consult other sources because official sources simply had not made themselves
available to reporters. “I had no choice,” he said. In contrast to the access he had previously had
at the CDC, “the federal government had imposed a news blackout for several days, and gagged
state and local officials. Calls, faxes, and e-mails to the federal agencies went unanswered.” 231
Furthermore, people in crisis want and need information, and they “can’t be expected to sit still
until the next press conference.” 232 On the other hand, Bhatt acknowledges that it may be
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socially irresponsible for public officials and reporters to admit they don’t know anything and/or
don’t have a handle on the situation. 233
Others in the press found fault with the way the CDC handled the press and controlled
information. Health writer and editor Patricia Thomas wrote about the interaction between
journalists and the CDC (and other federal agencies) in the wake of the anthrax attacks, assessing
“what went wrong.” 234 She said there was a struggle between journalists seeking information
about the anthrax attacks and the government agencies that “held a near monopoly” on that
information. 235 Journalists claimed—in print—that “usually helpful press officers were
stonewalling, government scientific experts were not being made available for interviews, and
public officials were generally failing to make accurate health information available fast
enough.” 236
However, Thomas said that she and other reporters didn’t blame the CDC. They blamed
the Bush administration for creating an “information shortfall” that bred panic, fear, and
confusion in the U.S. public, by exerting “tight government control of health and science news,”
by ordering the CDC and NIH not to talk without permission from the White House, and for
“mismanagement of news (that) harmed the public good.” 237 Thomas also blamed inadequate
staffing at the CDC to handle the thousands of anthrax- and bioterrorism-related calls the CDC’s
media office alone received during the first two weeks of the crisis. 238 In the meantime, news
outlets were resorting to seeking information from self-proclaimed experts and poorly-informed
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local health officials, resulting in further confusion as a number of outlets spread erroneous
information, including referring to the anthrax bacterium as the “anthrax virus.” 239
Two weeks after the attacks, Thomas said “HHS leadership realized that the public
needed more information from credible medical experts,” and changed the way the CDC was
responding to reporters. The CDC media relations staff issued press releases and a video news
release from then-director Koplan, staffed their press office with 15 media relations specialists
working in shifts, and posted additional information on the CDC Web site in Spanish as well as
English. 240 She said this was helpful, and that the CDC continued to make improvements in how
it provided the news media with information.
Thomas recommended several measures to avoid anthrax-attack-style confusion in the
case of future disasters. She cited risk communication best practices, saying that government
agencies should prepare fact sheets and a list of experts ready to distribute so accurate
information can be disseminated quickly. In order to prevent misinformation from reaching,
confusing, and frightening the public, she said “crisis communications experts emphasize that
credible doctors and scientists should be talking to the press from the start and should be
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available on a schedule that suits today’s 24-hour news cycle so that less reliable speakers will be
shut out.” 241
M. A. J. McKenna, a reporter for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the same Maryn
McKenna who authored Beating Back the Devil (referenced earlier in this study), wrote in a
Nieman Reports article that public health is an important beat because it “help(s) news
organizations interpret major developments in defense, health policy, international relations,
medical advances, and community needs.” 242 As such, public health requires a special set of
skills including familiarity with math, politics, budgets, science, epidemiology, and the ability to
see these things as part of a broader context. She said a public health reporter needed to be
willing to do “painstaking reporting” to “associate…numbers with actual victims.” 243 She
recommended asking “to prove significance and accuracy, what questions must we ask?” and
embracing the rigorous, dramatic, mystery-novel nature of public health reporting in order to
rescue it from the perception that it must be “dull but important.” 244
The Relationship of Journalism and Public Relations With Framing
Framing is a device that both the press and the public use to make sense of the world. In
the way of journalistic best practices, Meyer said that a reporter must be able to make sense out
of what he or she is reporting, and to understand those issues from multiple viewpoints. He said,
“The greatness of the New York Times derives…from a…struggle to acquire the expertise
necessary to broaden, sharpen, and deepen the perceptual apparatus of the institution” of
journalism. 245
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However, Meyer acknowledged that the realities of working in the newspaper medium
can work against reporters trying to produce the best possible journalism. He said, “Under
deadline pressure, the first cut at imposing pattern on observation rarely exposes the heart of the
matter.” 246
The structure of a newspaper’s daily operations may lend itself more to unintentional or
subtle influence rather than directly trying to control portrayal of events. Niblock described
newspapers as having a complex organizational structure with many interdependencies as well as
a hectic and relentless deadline and print schedule. She portrayed the daily schedules of many
different people who touch each editorial piece as they multi-task their way through the work
day: conducting research and interviews, visiting event scenes, reacting to breaking news,
writing the stories, editing, managing employees, and dealing with coworkers’ overlapping
schedules in a 24-hour newsroom. 247
Several authors gave different examples in which an increase in crime reporting resulted
in readers believing there was a crime wave, when statistically there was no more crime than
usual. The reporters reported facts about crimes that actually happened; it was the framing in the
context of increased crime reporting that led people to believe there was a crime wave. 248
While the press undoubtedly influences national (and local) discussions, sometimes
seemingly creating issues, it would be unfair and inaccurate to ignore their role as watchdog,
even in policing their own. Barry Glassner’s 249 book The Culture of Fear 250 is entirely
concerned with how news stories use meaningless statistics and framing devices (including
racism, sexism, and political motives) to blow minor and nonexistent risks out of proportion and
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make them the focus of national debate. However, amid numerous, specific examples of these
journalistic offenses, he came to the defense of some of the same media outlets, saying, that the
“institutions most culpable for creating and sustaining scares…are also the most promising
candidates for positive change.” 251
Glassner pointed out that of all the people involved in creating and framing issues—
advocacy organizations, corporate spokesmen, political parties, religious groups, et cetera—news
organizations are the only ones that can be objective, and that don’t have a major stake in the
outcome of an issue. Glassner said, “reporters not only spread fears; they also debunk them and
criticize one another for spooking the public.” 252 (Among the organizations he alternately
accuses and praises for this are the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington
Post, and USA Today.) Stakeholder organizations, on the other hand, tend to frame issues in the
most positive way possible for their organizations.
Other organizations, some of whom are not necessarily logical stakeholders in an issue,
may also seize upon an issue and frame it in a way that facilitates dissemination of their message.
Glassner cited examples of big-government frames used implicitly in the 1990s discussions
about unwed teenage mothers on welfare or food stamps 253 and vaccination 254 . Debate over
mandatory vaccination is also frequently framed as “big brother.”
In this way, framing can also allow a debate on a taboo topic under the guise of debating
another. Glassner provides several examples, including the subtle and not-so-subtle frames of
racism used to discuss various topics such as street drugs: articles about the scourge of opium in
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the 1870s were used as a forum to advocate discrimination against Chinese immigrants 255 .
Articles about crack babies 256 and unwed teenage mothers 257 were used in the 1980s and 1990s
to express and validate racist views of inner-city blacks.
Framing can be done intentionally and unintentionally. Speaking to the former position,
Meyer said, “The great responsibility of news producers is to tell people what to think about 258
However, framing is not necessarily intentional. Reporters do not always intend to influence
debate when they write a story. Meyer wrote that “What makes things news is a set of opinions
on the relative salience of different persons and events.” 259 “People differently placed in relation
to an event do indeed see different events” but that similarities may appear because the reporters
and leadership of different news organizations “are dealing with the same realities.” 260 Strentz
agreed with the latter position, saying “the power of the press” is a misleading concept “because
power often connotes a degree of formal and organized control to effect change, whereas
influence may be subtle, indirect, or unintended.” 261
TS Meyer said that if news is defined as “human statements about the world,” many
reporters address this by “simply gathering a number of statements from different humans.” 262
Each of these humans brings a different perception of the world and its events, resulting in an
unquantifiable number of different possible frames. “Each reporter has his or her own
background, education, opinion, and ‘apperceptive mass,’ as it used to be called. And each editor
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or producer responsible for the final shape of the story, in print or broadcast, has his or her own
view of what the readership or the audience wants to know or should know about this event.” 263
Frames are actually quite helpful in conveying meaning in a short space and a brief
amount of time, qualities which are essential in the newspaper business. Bob Franklin, a
journalism professor at the University of Cardiff, wrote about the necessity of framing in news
stories. “When people have little direct knowledge of events, they become increasingly reliant on
news media for information, but also an understanding or interpretation, of those events.” 264
Machin and Niblock wrote, “A story that already fits into an existing frame of reference will
seem naturally newsworthy. This will mean that the story will need less contextualization and
therefore less likely to lose the attention of the audience or readers.” 265
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Introduction to Case Studies
The 2001 Anthrax attacks were a turning point in the CDC’s role as a health
communication agency. The CDC’s communications and infectious disease staffs had not
previously been called upon to respond to anything like it before. Frames of terrorism, evil, and
killer diseases coming back from the forgotten past, presented against a backdrop of danger and
secrecy, and illustrated with repeated images of the World Trade Center towers burning and
collapsing all contributed to a highly emotional, nationwide atmosphere of panic and fear.
Government officials, including CDC communication staff, were criticized for their
response. Administration officials tightened control over information, so the communication
response was muddled, inadequate, and badly mishandled. Worst of all, it multiplied the frame of
fear through which the public was interpreting these events. Even the silence helped frame the
issue as unspeakable.
Fortunately, a lot of good came from the CDC’s experience. They analyzed and criticized
their own communication response to the attacks in numerous meetings and articles, and many
outside researchers offered criticism as well. Through this event, the CDC’s communication
personnel learned how important risk and crisis communication are to managing a dangerous and
frightening situation—or any other health risk.
In the literature, “risk communication” and “crisis communication” are sometimes used
interchangeably, and sometimes differentiated. For the purposes of this paper, risk
communication refers to communicating any kind of health risk, especially an ongoing one.
Examples of health risks include obesity, air pollution, or exposure to seasonal cold or flu. Risk
communication may involve explaining to an audience what their risks are, what they can do to
mitigate them, and why they would want to take precautions. Crisis communication refers to an
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acute-onset situation (like an outbreak, large-scale accident, or bioterrorism attack) that must be
managed. People in a crisis may be emotional and fearful; the crisis communicator must
demonstrate empathy, control, honesty, timeliness, and transparency.
The cases used in this study all exhibit the characteristics of health risk and crisis. They
evoke fear and emotional responses, and communicators must manage the situation by keeping
the public informed and by demonstrating control. The deadly outbreak of listeriosis food
poisoning in 2002 was a classic public health crisis situation: illness from an unknown food
source was sickening and killing people. Not only was the bacterium was known to cause
pregnant women to miscarry, but its manifestation showed, less than a year after 9/11, how easy
it would be to contaminate the nation’s food supply. The discovery that same summer that the
relatively new, deadly West Nile virus could be transmitted by organ transplant and blood
transfusion raised the specter of vulnerability in the nation’s transplant supply.
It is clear that risk and crisis communications would be the appropriate method of
handling these two situations. Both had unknowns, and the ability to generate fear and panic, and
both which needed to be managed. Both also had risk that needed to be addressed; audiences had
to be informed of what the risks were and how they could protect themselves.
The case of autism is less obvious. The causes and risk factors for autism aren’t known,
so it is not possible to communicate risk mitigation strategies. However, the situation with autism
resembles a health crisis in several ways. There are some very important unknowns about autism,
namely, how to treat or cure it, and how it is caused. The wide range and variety of symptoms
are also a source of ambiguity about the disease. As if the disorder weren’t a scary enough
proposition, it affects children—in fact, they are the entire focus of the debate—which adds to
the parental and societal fear. This fear is constant and ongoing, but parents are fearful, panicked,
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and emotional as they seek information about the disorder and seek to protect their children.
Autism was referred to by advocates as a crisis or epidemic, and parents wanted to be kept
informed as much as anybody in an outbreak or other crisis situation.
Frames of fear and emotion are the common denominator in all of these cases. Just as
framing can invoke those emotions, it can also be used to reassure and empower the public.
These cases illustrate what can happen when framing is used to advantage by different interests.
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Framing the 2002 Listeria Outbreak
In the year after the September 11 terrorists attacks and anthrax attacks, public officials
and the public alike worried about the vulnerability of the nation’s food and water supplies.
Preparedness work done in the wake of the attacks revealed how easy it would be for a terrorist
to release a poison or biological agent into the population. This fear framed numerous health
events and outbreaks.
An outbreak of food poisoning caused by Listeria monocytogenes 266 bacteria (listeriosis)
in late summer of 2002 prompted the largest recall of meat in U.S. history. Two poultry
processing plants owned by Pilgrim’s Pride ended up recalling 24.7 million pounds of processed
turkey and chicken by the time the outbreak was over. The outbreak also shone a light on
inadequate food inspection process and accusations of corruption in U.S. Department of
Agriculture leadership.
The earliest press mention of this outbreak 267 came when the “Nation in Brief” sections
of the September 15 Washington Post and Los Angeles Times warned of an “unexpected
increase” in listeriosis cases in Pennsylvania. 268 An article in the September 17 New York Times
said that six people in the New York City area had died of listeriosis that summer, but that the
source was still unknown. The writer interviewed a spokesman for the Pennsylvania Department
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of Health; he described the Listeria bacteria’s unusual propensity for thriving in cold
temperatures and on previously cooked meat. 269
On September 18 the CDC responded with a press release. 270 As the outbreak progressed
and more information became available, the agency continued issuing a steady stream of press
release updates on the outbreak. The agency disseminated 14 releases in less than two months.
However, by the time the outbreak had been identified (September 18), 26 people had already
become ill, and four had died. 271
Most of the CDC’s press releases, including the first one, were scientific in tone and did
not appear to be particularly aimed at the public. The releases mentioned “acquired illness from
the same food” without a more public-friendly reference to “food poisoning.” The first release
wrote, in epidemiologic terms, of the “‘background’ of sporadic Listeria infections that are
expected to occur.” 272 The first three releases announced, in the second sentence of each release,
that “the Listeria bacteria has been isolated and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)matched” to the sick patients. 273 The releases warned pregnant women, newborns, the elderly,
and others with weakened immune systems to be especially careful; food-safety tips followed the
warnings. As the toll of the outbreak climbed, the CDC releases continued to faithfully report the
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statistics and the specifics, including warnings more carefully targeted at vulnerable populations,
including pregnant women who could miscarry due to even a minor Listeria infection.
Despite the rising number of illnesses and deaths, the newspapers did not report on the
outbreak right away. In fact, it wasn’t until October 4, seven CDC press releases and nearly two
weeks later, that the press started to pick up on the story. This is notable considering the potential
for media priming: the number of high-profile food poisoning cases and large-scale food recalls
that had already happened in 2002, and the bioterrorism fears that lingered barely a year after the
9/11 attacks. The illness and death tolls were rising, but the CDC announced that the leading
suspect was not bioterrorism, but deli turkey. 274
In contrast to the scientific, factual frame of the CDC press releases, many newspaper
reports focused on corruption, bureaucracy, and ineptitude of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the department largely responsible for the safety of the nation’s meat
supply. Most reports expressed outrage at the incompetence and/or collusion of USDA
leadership and the lack of standards governing the U. S. food supply. Some reports praised a
USDA inspector who risked disapproval from his supervisors to bring the problems at the
Pilgrims Pride plants to light. One New York Times story on October 5 reported that the CDC had
linked 40 illnesses and 7 deaths to the same strain of the bacteria, and that they suspected sliced
deli turkey. “The Agriculture Department, however, has not been able to confirm this.” 275
On October 9, a CDC release confirmed that the USDA announced a voluntary recall of
turkey meat; 276 a Washington Post article the next day confirmed that 295,000 pounds of turkey
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and chicken products were being recalled. However, the article noted, the products were
produced on August 14, and that the “use by” dates on the products in question had already
started to pass. 277 That same day, the New York Times reported that the USDA “said that tests
show no link between this recall and the Listeria outbreak that has killed seven people.” 278
However, the Times pointed out that “inspectors were searching for the source of that strain
when they discovered contaminated turkey pastrami that was produced at the corporations’
Wampler Foods plant in Franconia, PA, on August 14.” 279 Furthermore, on October 13,
inspectors found samples of the deadly Listeria strain at the Pilgrim’s Pride Franconia plant.
They closed the plant, and announced an additional recall of over 27 million pounds of turkey.
The onus was placed on consumers to “check their refrigerators and freezers” for the recalled
meat, and return it to the place where they had bought it. 280 The amount of the additional recall
included all turkey produced since May, and Pilgrim’s Pride officials estimated that roughly twothirds of that had “probably been eaten or thrown out by now.” 281
Newspapers continued to call for reform of the nation’s meat safety regulations. They
interviewed consumer and environmental groups, including members of the Sierra Club, and the
Consumer Federation of America. 282
Wampler and Pilgrim’s Pride officials continued to maintain that none of their products
were linked to the outbreak. 283 Elizabeth Becker of the New York Times reported that Pilgrim’s
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Pride chief financial officer Roger Cogdill “disagreed with the (consumer) advocates, who, he
said, failed to appreciate the voluntary nature of his company’s recall.” 284 (This is notable
because all recalls were technically voluntary, as the USDA did not have the authority to recall
any food for any reason.) Cogdill also attempted to spin the cramped, dirty conditions at their
feedlot as one that allowed them to better “control bacteria in the animals.” 285 It is fairly clear,
from the messages to the choice of spokesperson, that Pilgrim’s Pride was too busy trying to dig
themselves out of a hole to worry about effective framing. Choosing as a spokesman someone
whose main responsibility is to protect the company’s stock price when people are dying goes
against public relations and risk communications best practices that recommend choosing a
spokesperson who can be honest and empathetic with the effected population, and who
demonstrates a genuine interest in entering a dialogue with them.
The listeriosis outbreak came right on the heels of another rash of food poisonings from
tainted meat, one of several outbreaks that contributed greatly to the press framing of the
listeriosis outbreak. In July 2002, an E. coli outbreak sickened 26 people and prompted ConAgra
to recall 19 million pounds of beef. This episode inspired an editorial in the Atlanta JournalConstitution calling for the federal government to streamline and toughen current food inspection
practices. The article said the current “laissez-faire regulatory scheme” is “ripe for all manner of
abuse,” and currently involves 10 different, understaffed agencies and no “enforceable industry
performance standards.” The article further invoked the frames of government ineptitude and
industry corruption by pointing out that USDA leadership ignored warnings from its own
personnel as early as February 2002 regarding E. coli in the same Colorado ConAgra plant
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responsible for the E. coli outbreak. 286 Additionally, the Los Angeles Times had published stories
that August about Listeria contamination in cheesecakes supplied by the Cheesecake Factory to
19 Olive Garden restaurants, 287 and another recall that month of 10,000 packages of queso fresco
due to potential Listeria contamination. 288
The story continued to unfold, with more evidence of corruption being uncovered. Becker
wrote that a May 2002 memo to new USDA meat inspectors had been made public. She said that
in the memo, “inspectors were told that they could be held accountable for lost production” if
they had a plant shut down or slowed production for an inspection, and later “failed to justify”
doing so. 289 USDA and industry spokespeople continued to deny any wrongdoing, but this only
seemed to help consumer advocates and the press in their attempts to show the USDA and the
meatpacking industry as corrupt and unreasonable. Becker said the May 2002 memo went so far
as to define the “limits of what is considered feces.” 290 She then quoted Carol Tucker Foreman
of the Consumer Federation of America, who said, “Poop is poop. I can’t think of any
circumstance where it is tolerable to have fecal material on any meat coming off the line.” 291
This effectively framed the issue of increased government oversight as a simple choice: do you
want to eat fecal matter in your food or not?
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On October 15, ten days after the CDC’s press releases first said it suspected the
Pilgrim’s Pride plant, the USDA announced that the plant was likely the source of the
outbreak. 292 However, the New York Times reported the USDA’s Stephen Cohen as saying that
despite the announcement, USDA investigators hadn’t actually found any of that same strain of
bacteria in the meat products. However, the CDC’s press releases continued to name Pilgrim’s
Pride as the culprit. CDC spokesman Tom Skinner was reported in an October 16 USA Today
article as saying that the turkey from the Pilgrim’s Pride plant in Franconia, PA, was the likely
source, and that (according to the author) “it was highly unlikely that matching samples of the
microbe taken from the plant and patients were not linked.” 293
There were more accusations of corruption. An October 16 editorial in the New York
Times focused on corruption in the USDA, saying that despite multiple outbreaks and several
deaths, “the department appears in no hurry to activate safety standards that could reduce the risk
of future outbreaks.” 294 The author accused the USDA of being “under industry influence” and
declining to adequately regulate, test, and label meat before it enters the marketplace. 295
With over 27 million pounds of deli meat being recalled from the general food supply,
and most of it eaten before the recall was issued, it would be expected that some of the deli meat
would have been consumed by children. Some articles touched upon this fear and engaged in
some episodic framing, including one article featuring interviews with parents whose children
had died in various food poisoning episodes. 296 The New York Times reported that these families
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went to Washington, D.C. to lobby for better oversight of the food processing industry, including
giving the USDA the authority to issue recalls. 297 One of the advocacy groups managed to frame
the food safety issue in terms of the war on terror, saying, “Our children and our families deserve
not to encounter terror at the dinner table,” and urged President Bush to “declare a war on
foodborne illness.” 298 The article was illustrated by a photo of a little girl with her mother,
looking at a scrapbook of photos of her late brother, who died from food poisoning. However, in
this same article, Rosemary Mucklow from the National Meat Association was quoted
attempting to place the responsibility on the individual, saying that the industry didn’t need more
regulation; consumers needed to be educated. “The biggest issue is to get the consumer to cook
the meat thoroughly.” 299 (Remember that the meat involved in this recall was pre-cooked, readyto-eat deli meat.)
On October 18, the New York Times reported that Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman
had announced increased plant testing. This was said to be the first response to the outbreak by
anyone in the Bush administration. 300 By October 29, top government officials were reported in
USA Today as saying the meat industry’s inspection system was “broken” and that they intended
to address the issue. J. Patrick Boyle of the American Meat Institute was reported in the same
article as saying that if that was the case, it was also the fault of government, “a joint failing.” 301
The outbreak may have been over by November 4, but the story was still evolving. The
Los Angeles Times reported that the Philadelphia Inquirer had discovered that inspectors had
warned their superiors of “numerous sanitation violations,” including mold and cockroaches,
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present at the Pilgrim’s Pride plant months before it was implicated in the outbreak. 302 By
December 12, the New York Times and Washington Post had named this whistleblower as
Vincent Erthal, a USDA inspector who claimed his efforts to “force a cleanup…eight months
before the outbreak” had been thwarted by the chief government inspector there. 303 The
Washington Post reported Erthal as saying he had filed two year’s worth of reports citing the
unsanitary conditions; it also reported top USDA officials and officials in the meat industry as
trying to cast doubt on his claims. 304 They were probably unknowingly—framing him as a hero
to the victims of the big-government, big-industry corruption they were also unknowingly
creating. In a December 15 article that eventually became part of her Beating Back the Devil
book, M.A.J. McKenna also framed the public health officials who investigated the Listeria
outbreak (and were largely ignored by both the CDC’s press releases and the press during the
outbreak) as heroes, risking their own safety to keep the public healthy.305
In this incident, most newspapers in this study sought out numerous dissenting voices,
but only after speaking only with the official spokespeople at the USDA and Pilgrim’s Pride.
Once the “official” sources seemed to be hiding something, the press dug deeper to find out what
the real story was. Despite the alluring framing devices of government scandal, industry
corruption, sickness, death, and lumbering bureaucracies, the press did not succumb to the
temptation to sensationalize. The CDC largely stayed out of the fray by presenting scientific
facts with no apparent agenda attached, other than helping people stay healthy during a crisis.
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Hallahan, Iyengar, Wallack et al., and others wrote about the news media’s tendency to
use episodic framing and how that lends itself to framing issues as the responsibility or fault of
corrupt individuals rather than a corrupt system. The coverage of this outbreak certainly pointed
fingers at the top USDA officials who Vincent Erthal said had been warned of the contamination
before the outbreak occurred. However, while the articles didn’t find fault with society as a
whole, they did implicate the entire convoluted process of food plant inspections, which had
proven quite inadequate to protect the U.S. food supply. Some also found fault with the Bush
administration 306 for blocking legislation, written during the waning days of the Clinton
administration, that proponents said would have made the inspection process more effective. 307
Another story presented an unusual (at least in this outbreak) twist on the thematic frame, saying
people were much more likely to die on the nation’s highways, from an accidental fall than from
eating contaminated meat; the author, John Balzar, attempted to demonstrate these fears as
overblown by comparing the odds to those of being killed in a gang murder or drowning in the
bathtub. 308
Wallach et al. said that health issues are usually framed as individual responsibility, to the
exclusion of implicating systemic problems. 309 This is the case from standpoint of the public
health officials quoted in the articles. The meat industry and Pilgrim’s Pride spokespeople, on the
other hand, certainly positioned the issue as each person’s responsibility to protect themselves.
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By the time the outbreak was over, 53 people had taken ill, eight had died, and three
pregnant women had miscarried. The CDC’s press releases, despite taking a non-public-friendly
scientific tone, were intended to aid in the treatment and prevention of illness. In fact, 13 of the
CDC’s 14 releases on the outbreak described the symptoms of listeriosis and precautions to
avoid becoming ill. Despite not containing a single quote from a CDC official, the releases were
factual and frequent, and framed the CDC as being both above the fray and in control of the
situation, as well as showing much more concern for people’s health than the spokespeople from
the USDA and the meat processing companies.
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Framing West Nile Virus Transmission Through Organ Transplant, 2002
West Nile virus is now established as a seasonally-recurring disease in North America,
but in 2002 it was still new and had the power to frighten people. Experts believe the
mosquitoborne virus arrived in the United States from Africa or the Middle East in 1999 310 , and
it manifested over the next few summers as a painful illness that felled countless crows, some
horses, and humans, starting with an outbreak in New York City.
In early August 2002, a Georgia woman’s organs were harvested for transplant after she
succumbed to injuries received in a car accident a month earlier. Four people received her
organs. Later, all four recipients tested positive for West Nile virus infection. The organ donor
had been in a coma for a month, and had received numerous blood transfusions before she died.
Officials came to suspect that she contracted West Nile from the transfusions.
The possibility of contracting a deadly disease through what was intended to be a
lifesaving procedure is just the kind of story that sells newspapers. West Nile virus, or WNV,
had only been discovered in the United States three years prior. Originally from Africa, West
Nile Virus can cause encephalitis, nerve pain, fever, and death. It was known to be transmitted
by mosquitoes; horses and birds were known animal reservoirs. In short, it’s a subject that invites
sensationalist journalism. On the other hand, serious threats require thoughtful research, if
humanity is to benefit from the work.
The 2002 West Nile season was shaping up to be particularly bad. By August 20, there
had already been 251 cases of West Nile virus in the United States in 2002, with a projection of
up to 1000 cases for the year. 311 New York Times reporter Denise Grady asked, Why here? Why
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now? Until 1999, the disease had never even been detected in North America.” She answered
this question by placing West Nile Virus in the context of an increasing number of new diseases
that had appeared since the mid-1970’s, “a time when it was widely assumed that most infectious
diseases had been conquered or at least controlled.” Grady cited a 2000 report by the World
Health Organization that blamed the rise of disease emergence on ecological factors (including
global warming), human factors including war and population growth, international travel and
commerce, microbial factors including antibiotic resistance, breakdowns in public health
measures including vaccination and insect control, and “technological and industrial factors like
food processing, livestock handling, and organ transplants.” 312
On August 30, the CDC announced that there had been 638 cases of West Nile virus with
31 fatalities in 2002 so far. 313 On this same date, the Washington Post pointed out that the
number of new cases for the week of August 21–28 represented a 62% increase over the previous
week, but also said that “the number (of new cases) was expected to peak by midSeptember.” 314 315
Also by this date, the CDC had already disseminated five press releases on this year’s
West Nile season. They all featured an update on the number of cases and fatalities by state, but
two of them featured quotes by then-HHS secretary Tommy Thompson and CDC director Dr.
Julie Gerberding. The August 28 release announced HHS funding to help states fight the disease;
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Dr. Gerberding warned, “West Nile virus is rapidly emerging this summer in previously
unaffected areas.” 316
West Nile virus, though it had been a common news topic over the past three years, still
had the power to frighten, and as such, it was sometimes framed in the context of other historical
plagues. One Maryland man wrote, in a letter to the health section editor of the Washington Post,
that the dead birds and rodents he presumed had fallen prey to the virus, “reminds me of the
bubonic plague of the Middle Ages.” 317 In an August 30 editorial in the Washington Post, a D.C.
artist focused on the disappearance of the once-ubiquitous crows from her neighborhood. She
pondered the crows’ suffering from West Nile virus and how the spread of the disease could
mean disaster for some bird species. She also framed the disease in the context of the “countless
holocausts, natural and human-engineered” that the world has seen, and said that “(w)hile (West
Nile’s) effect on the human population has, thankfully, not been nearly as widespread as on other
species, we are just beginning to appreciate its virulence.” 318 Not only did she use the frame of
past tragedies to evoke emotion, but she also invoked a frame of globalism, the idea that the
planet’s creatures, or at least its people, share a common fate, to some degree.
The earliest press report 319 that someone may have contracted West Nile Virus from an
organ transplant came from the New York Times, in an August 31 article titled, “Transplant May
Have Led to West Nile in Man, 71.” 320 The man had died from the illness. The article quoted
both Dr. Gerberding and Florida’s secretary of health, Dr. John O. Agwunobi, both of whom
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appeared to be concerned, yet calm and in control. Article author Lawrence K. Altman further
added to the sense of control by mentioning that West Nile is most likely to cause serious illness
in those with weakened immune systems, including organ transplant patients, 321 allowing people
who considered themselves in good health the opportunity to not worry about it. It wasn’t until
later in the article that he raised the possibility that the ability for West Nile to be transmitted this
way may pose a threat to the nation’s blood supply. “We have a lot of work to do, but we are
doing it fast,” the article quotes Dr. Gerberding as saying. 322
The next day a CDC press release came out saying that the agency, along with the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) 323 , the Georgia State Department of Health, and the Florida
Department of Health were investigating all four patients who received transplanted organs from
the Georgia woman, based on “preliminary evidence…that these illnesses might be due to West
Nile virus infection.” The release also stated that although such transmission “has been a
theoretical possibility,” it had not actually been observed.324 The New York Times reported that
one of these patients, also from Florida, had West Nile fever (as opposed to encephalitis), a
milder form of the illness. 325 The Times article appeared on page 18 of the paper, but the story
made the front page of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. M.A.J. McKenna seized on the novelty
of the situation, writing that “if all four infections are confirmed and linked to the transplants…it
would represent the first time that West Nile virus is known to have been transmitted from
person to person in any manner.” 326 Having grabbed readers’ attention with that, she said later in
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the article that health officials wanted to make quite clear that transmission through blood or
organs had not been confirmed. She quoted Dr. James Hughes, director of the CDC’s National
Center for Infectious Diseases, saying, “we feel it is a high priority to rapidly and aggressively
investigate” the possible cases person-to-person transmission. 327 McKenna also mentioned in her
article that the investigation would likely be complex, and that they would first have to rule out
coincidental infection by a mosquito bite, something not altogether impossible since all patients
resided in areas where West Nile was already present. She also reiterated that the patients were
all on immunosuppressant drugs following their transplants, which made them more susceptible
to a serious form of West Nile. 328
West Nile is an imported disease, and this is occasionally mentioned using a frame of
foreignness. This associates the disease with other “loathsome” foreign things: immigrant hordes
carrying disease, Africanized “killer” bees, AIDS, and other “foreign” invaders. McKenna
mentions in an article another case of foreign disease, Chagas disease, contracted by patients at
Emory University School of Medicine after receiving organs from an immigrant. 329 The New
York Times likened the potential threat to the blood supply to the threat caused by English blood
donors who might carry bovine spongiform encephalitis, or “mad cow” disease. 330
Throughout the course of this investigation, press articles featured plenty of quotes by
different officials, indicating that spokespeople must have been readily available to answer
questions. These spokespeople, mostly from the CDC, but some from the Georgia and Florida
state health departments and the FDA, were fairly consistent about staying “on message,” saying
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that the risk for contracting West Nile via a transplant or transfusion was very low, and that the
best way to protect oneself from West Nile virus is to wear insect repellant and long pants and
sleeves when in mosquito-infested areas. For the most part, the reporters seemed to appreciate
the forthcoming nature of the health officials, and most stories seemed to agree with them that
the risk of transmission via the manner in question was low.
However, some stories mentioned the scary unknowns, like the fact that “it was not
known how many” other people had been transfused with blood from the supply that may have
infected the index patient. 331 A USA Today article titled “Officials Fear Human Spread of West
Nile…” said “officials are working…to determine the threat that the West Nile virus poses to
recipients of blood transfusions and donated organs.” 332 This language suggests that there is, in
fact, a threat, a fear, despite health officials’ messages that the risk is actually very low.
Likewise, McKenna reported the following: “Asked if the government could assure the
public that the blood supply is absolutely safe, (Dr. Jesse) Goodman (of the FDA) said no.” 333
Considering McKenna’s usual respect for the open access and good relationship she had with the
CDC’s researchers, leadership, and media relations staff, why did she report that they couldn’t
“absolutely” guarantee something that’s impossible to guarantee at any time? Perhaps she was
trying a fear appeal to spice up her story. Perhaps it was because this was an FDA spokesman
and not someone from the CDC. Whatever the reason, intentional or not, it framed the issue as a
reason for fear, and as an aberration, a flaw in the system—more episodic than thematic—and it
is probably the sort of angle that gets more eyes on the page.
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The case of West Nile being transmitted through organ transplant and blood transfusion
could have caused quite a panic if officials hadn’t made themselves available to answer
questions, address concerns, and keep a uniform message of safety and reassurance to the public.
CDC Media Relations staff reassured and informed public but also used the press releases as an
opportunity to reinforce the message of prevention in what was already proving to be an
especially bad West Nile virus season. The good reception journalists gave forthcoming public
health officials seems to confirm framing theorists’ notions that the press generally supports the
notion of a sound society with problems caused by occasional flaws, corruption, or aberrations.
This was also apparent in the previous case study on listeriosis. Autism, however, may illustrate
what happens in a more drawn-out situation.
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The Autism Debate, 2002–2007
The causes of autism were hotly debated throughout the study period in most major U.S.
newspapers. However, despite the 2277 autism articles that appeared in the five major U.S.
newspapers analyzed in the six-year study period 334 , the CDC distributed only 7 press releases.
As the public clamored for information, this relative silence allowed—or forced—the
newspapers, influenced by the sources they interviewed, to frame the issue themselves.
Numerous issues are at the heart of this controversy, and the confusion surrounding the
debate contributes to its perpetuation. Many parents, especially those of autistic children, believe
they know what causes autism and autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). To them, the things they
see—a child regressing into autism after receiving a vaccine, a child having fewer behavioral and
physical symptoms after a diet change or removal of an allergen 335 , geeky parents 336 —may
appear to be irrefutable evidence. However, ASDs cover a wide array of physical and mental
symptoms, which in turn vary greatly in their severity, and scientists have yet to find the cause or
the cure. Further complicating the issue is the fact that some autism appears to be present in
some children from early infancy, while others appear to develop normally and then regress in
toddlerhood or early childhood. Also, many researchers contend that it is the autism diagnoses—
not the cases—that are actually on the rise. Reasons for this are given as growing awareness of
the disorder, an expansion of the definition to encompass an entire “spectrum” of symptoms, and
the fact that an autism diagnosis is often the only way for families to get special education and

334

This number is based on ProQuest and Factiva database search results. These are the same five newspapers
used in this study.
335
Luke T. Curtis and Kalpana Patel, “Nutritional and Environmental Approaches to Preventing and Treating
Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): A Review,” The Journal of Alternative and
Complementary Medicine 14 (2008): 79-85.
336
Steve Silberman, The Geek Syndrome, Wired 9(12). From the Wired Magazine Web site at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/aspergers_pr.html. Accessed 27 May 2008.

96
services for children with a wide array of symptoms and behavioral problems. 337 It is a
frustrating condition for all involved, from the people who have it, to the people who care for
them, to the researchers who devote their lives to finding a cause or a cure.
The main focus of the vaccine-autism debate has been the mercury compound thimerosal.
Thimerosal 338 was developed in 1928 and has been used for decades as a vaccine preservative.
Thimerosal is an ethylmercury compound; however, most lay allegations of risk and effects on
neurological development are based on studies of methylmercury. Methylmercury, the
environmental mercury toxin released by burning coal, is known to cause problems with
neurological development in children, and takes much longer to leave the body than
ethylmercury. 339 And while some maintain that the symptoms of mercury poisoning and autism
are the same, many researchers maintain that the symptoms appear similar only superficially and
are actually quite different. 340
Most of the debate focuses on the MMR (measles-mumps-rubella) vaccine. The 1998
Lancet article that actually sparked the debate documented a study of 12 children who were
referred to the study after they had exhibited developmental disorders, and the suspicion of a link
to MMR initially came from the parents of eight of the children, not the researchers or
doctors. 341 The article focused on the children’s gastrointestinal symptoms and suggested faulty
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digestive processes may be a cause of autism, and that symptoms improved after removal of
certain allergens. It also mentioned that the behavioral changes the children underwent were
dissimilar. They concluded that more research was needed to “examine this syndrome and its
possible causal relation to this vaccine.” 342 However, despite numerous articles finding no
scientific basis for a causal link between the MMR vaccine and autism, including a 2004 partial
retraction by most of the authors (in which they said, “no causal link was established between
MMR vaccine and autism”) 343 , the debate spread and flourished in the popular press. In fact,
anti-vaccine activists managed to tie the idea that vaccines cause autism to the debate so firmly
that as awareness of autism grew, so did the debate about vaccines.
It is especially important to study media coverage of the autism debate; James Colgrove
and Ronald Bayer said public health officials worry that “the system of routine childhood
immunization in the United States rests on a tenuous foundation of public support.” 344 The
authors also claimed the “popular media” as one of the main ways in which “concerns over
vaccine safety have emerged and diffused.” 345
Compulsory vaccination of children before registering for school is a law in every U.S.
state (and all allow medical exemptions), but a vocal minority chooses not to have their children
vaccinated. According to the Institute for Vaccine Safety, run by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, all but two U.S. states allow religious exemptions to vaccination. 346 In
addition, 21 states allow “personal belief” exemptions, which includes “religious, philosophical,
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and any other unspecified non-medical exemption.” 347 Many parents cite fears of vaccine-related
injury in their choices not to vaccinate.
While vaccination is technically mandatory, people on both sides of the issue sometimes
frame it as a choice, in which they need to assess the risks and make their own decisions. Those
who don’t want their children vaccinated may use this frame perhaps because it empowers them,
or they feel the risk of compliance is dangerous; the CDC may use this frame subtly when it
recommends that people discuss concerns with their health care professional. This serves several
purposes: it empowers people to make their own decisions (or at least feel like they did),
possibly decreases resistance to the policy by making the agency look less totalitarian 348 , and
finally, the CDC probably knew that most doctors would probably convince their patients of the
benefits of vaccination.
Since controversy over thimerosal in vaccines began in 1998, thimerosal has been
removed from all routine childhood vaccines in the United States, with the exception of some
seasonal flu vaccines. 349 Though researchers had been unable to find a causal link, they
acknowledged that it was biologically possible for such a chemical to cause disruptions in
neurological development. 350 It is doubtful whether they would have removed it, however, had it
not been for the uproar. Nonetheless, this was the official stand:
The CDC, American Academy of Pediatrics, Institute of Medicine
and other prestigious medical organizations maintain there is no
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known link between vaccines and autism. Studies published in the
New England Journal of Medicine and elsewhere also have found
no link. Even after thimerosal was removed from infant vaccines,
the autism rate has continued to climb. 351
However, that didn’t stop thousands of parents from writing letters to editors, protesting at
various CDC campuses, taking out ads, building Web sites, and homeschooling their children in
an effort to “protect” them from government-mandated vaccines. The “big government” frame
here was obvious. In addition, the surest way in most states to prevent a child from being
vaccinated was to claim a religious exemption. This fed directly into the faith vs. science frame
that the CDC already found themselves fighting on so many fronts.
The fact that thimerosal was removed from all routine childhood vaccines in 2001 352 did
not stop some people for implicating it. During 2002 and 2003 the debate in the press about
whether vaccines caused autism was just starting to pick up steam. There were a few articles in
2002 about families suing for damages, claiming vaccines had caused their children’s autism 353 ,
and about people suspicious that vaccines caused autism. 354 However most journalists seemed
skeptical of a link. In a thematically-framed USA Today article, Anita Manning wrote about
parents who believe vaccines cause autism, saying that the “mainstream medical experts” who
claim vaccines are safe are “backed by reams of scientific studies.” 355 She interviewed several
people on both sides of the debate but referred back to the existence of much scientific evidence
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refuting the theories, using the interviews to illustrate the harm that can come when unvaccinated
people spread disease. 356 In another article, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution’s David Wahlberg
weighed the pros and cons of different vaccines; he clearly opposition-framed the diseases as
being much more dangerous than the vaccines. 357 Likewise, Donald J. McNeil wrote in a New
York Times article that fish, not vaccines, are the largest source of mercury for humans. 358 Both
Manning and McNeil wrote that people aren’t afraid of the vaccine-preventable diseases that
killed so many just a few generations ago, because they have never seen them, 359 so they don’t
believe they are a threat.
In 2003, there were more articles covering the debate, many quoting medical
professionals (mostly pro-vaccination) and parents of autistic children (some pro-vaccination,
some against), but few CDC spokespeople. There were a few emotional stories about autistic
children whose parents claimed the autism was brought on by vaccination, but the latter half of
one story focused on themes of redemption 360 ; another discussed the possibility of recovering
from autism. 361 Jane Brody of the New York Times wrote in “Vaccines and Autism: Beyond the
Fear Factor,” that “overwhelming evidence so far suggests that thimerosal poses no significant
threat to the developing brain.” 362 She also provided evidence that mercury poisoning and autism
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have different symptoms. 363 Another article discussed soaring measles cases when vaccination
rates declined. 364
In 2002 and 2003, though, several articles chronicle some controversy over an
amendment to a homeland security bill that would prevent vaccine makers, including thimerosal
manufacturer Eli Lilly, from being sued by people claiming vaccines caused autism in a family
member. The issue was eventually settled, with language that still protected the vaccine makers,
and with support from the American Academy of Pediatrics. 365 However, this government
protection made anti-vaccine campaigners suspicious.
The autism debate went on in the press for two years of the 2002-2007 study period
before the CDC’s Media Relations staff weighed in. The first press release they produced during
this time didn’t come until February 2005. It was a release promoting the “Learn the Signs. Act
Early” awareness campaign, designed to educate parents about developmental milestones in
early childhood, and about how early intervention can greatly ameliorate developmental
disabilities. 366 In this release they mentioned the often cited statistic that as many as “1 in 166
children have a condition in the autism spectrum.” 367
This “1 in 166” statistic is often interpreted in the press and in the literature of antivaccine or anti-thimerosal advocates as 1 in 166 children having autism, whereas the medical
community interprets the autism spectrum as covering a vast array of conditions and severities
rather than being one disorder. This evokes the frightening idea that 1 out of 166 American
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children are deeply and permanently mentally disabled; thus was the issue framed by the
omission of the details. Many members of the press likely lacked the training to understand what
the terms meant. However, it indicates both a further need for training, and the responsibility of
journalists to question and investigate terms and numbers in health journalism.
Although many researchers and public health officials lament—and are frustrated by—
the profusion of nonscientific and anecdotal information used to refute their scientific studies,
practicing pediatrician Rahul K. Parikh wrote that the scientific community would do well to
learn a lesson from their detractors. Parikh wrote in March 2008 about attending a recent national
conference of the American Academy of Pediatrics, particularly one lecture in which
”pediatricians from around the country shared story after story of parents who have refused shots
on the basis of what they had seen on Oprah (specifically a particular September 2007
episode) 368 and elsewhere in the media.” 369 Parikh said that such stories persist “despite ample
research” that debunked the original 1998 article (also retracted) claiming a vaccine-autism link
for two main reasons: ineffective communications from the “vaccine defenders” (he names the
CDC by way of example) and the compelling emotional appeals made by the proponents of a
vaccine-autism link. 370
Parikh said that many parents interpret the “bureaucratic…and…cautious language”
typical of many scientific and government communications, including those on the vaccineautism issue, as uncertainty and an indication that “the vaccines are not safe at all.” 371 As an
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example, he quoted the official CDC statement 372 that Winfrey read to the audience on her
autism show. It was, as Parikh said, “reasonable, clear, and…sympathetic to parents of autistic
children,” but audiences picked up on the “measured tone,” which “arouses suspicion and
uncertainty among readers.” 373 He said the tactic of ignoring the assertions of a vaccine-autism
link in an effort to “stay above the fray” or refuse credence to their claims can also backfire, as
“such silence…can easily be interpreted as concealing a truth.” 374
By way of finding a better approach, Parikh looked at the work of cognitive psychologist
Drew Westin 375 to see what the other camp was doing successfully. “Antivaccine groups are
well-organized and passionate,” he said, and they use “popular settings” (like Oprah) as venues
“to make strong emotional appeals.” 376 These emotional appeals have been essential to
convincing parents of autistic children to join groups in blaming vaccines. He said that “logic
and evidence,” on which the CDC’s autism communicators have been relying, are not as
persuasive as powerful emotional appeals, as well as “anecdotes, quips, and resonant campaign
ads.” 377 Thus, Parikh concluded, “we have had a failure to persuade.” 378
Finally, Parikh suggested an aggressive approach to regaining control of the autism
conversation. He said that health and medical research groups, including the CDC 379 , needed to
“be more potent when arguing as to why vaccines are safe, effective, and necessary.” 380 He said
they needed to counter emotional appeals with their own emotional appeals, saying, “if
372
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opponents to vaccines put a celebrity on Oprah, then we need to take out a full-page ad in
national newspapers to show parents what a child with tetanus looks like, or air an ad with a
parent telling the story of how their child died from…meningitis.” 381 Such tactics would be
acceptable “if done ethically” because they tell “the truth…that vaccines save lives.” 382 He also
said that they needed to “craft effective language” to respond to accusations against vaccines,
and defend their beliefs and research more strongly because they have the power to make a
change. 383
The language in the CDC autism press releases is scientifically appropriate, but as Parikh
stated, also impersonal and bureaucratic. It hardly spoke to an audience that was upset about a
very personal, emotional issue. It may have worked for West Nile and listeriosis, in which people
were given precautions for prevention, and either treatment advice (listeriosis) or a reasonable
assurance of low risk (West Nile), but with the causes unknown and no cure, it didn’t work for
autism.
A few health journalists whose articles were generally supportive of the scientific
position on vaccination provided some fodder for the anti-vaccine camp. USA Today’s Anita
Manning, for instance, wrote several articles that were very supportive of the scientific evidence
that vaccines were safe, and repeatedly mentioned the danger to society when people choose not
to get vaccinated. On the other hand, she also wrote often of the controversy, thereby proving it
newsworthy, and her articles sought balance by including interviews of people in both camps.

2006 Autism Ad in USA Today Sparks CDC Response
The scientific evidence refutes a link between autism and vaccination: “Since 2001, with
the exception of some influenza (flu) vaccines, thimerosal is not used as a preservative in
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routinely recommended childhood vaccines.” 384 However, the groups of people who disagree are
very vocal—and in opposition to the CDC’s stand.
In 2006, one of these groups accomplished something 2277 articles hadn’t been able to
do: generate a direct response from the CDC office of media relations. The founders of
Generation Rescue, 385 under the name Put Children First, ran a full-page ad 386 in USA Today,
alleging that the CDC “created an epidemic of autism in America” by requiring children to
receive mercury-laden vaccinations, and that the agency was covering up the evidence. The ad
asked, via a half-page-high headline, “If you caused a 6,000% increase in autism, wouldn’t you
try to cover it up, too?” The ad also chided the CDC for not investigating the treatment regimen
Generation Rescue’s Web sites advocated, and said, “As long as the CDC denies that mercury
from vaccines is responsible for this epidemic proper treatment will never be made widely
available to the more than one million American children 387 who could be treated today.” Other
Generation Rescue ads (available on their Web site) ads included messages about children who
“recovered from autism.”
Unlike all the other autism press releases disseminated by the CDC’s media relations
staff, this one was empathetic, direct, and firm. The release positively framed the work CDC
researchers have done, and continue to do, on autism. The authors of the release framed the quest
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for causes and cures for autism as a personal 388 struggle for not only for the families of autistic
children, but the researchers as well. They admitted they didn’t know all the answers yet and said
they had “a long way to go” before they had the “sound, scientifically valid information” they
needed. They in turn applied a loss frame to the possibility of reduced vaccination rates, saying
that “history has shown that disruptions in vaccine supplies can render the population more
vulnerable to diseases we know we can prevent.” 389
The release also did two things that were extremely rare for a CDC press release. First, it
directly criticized Put Children First’ USA Today ad. “We are extremely disappointed,” the
release said. “The advertisement completely mischaracterizes the efforts of the CDC, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the Institute of Medicine, and others to protect the health and
well-being of the nation’s children.” 390 Second, it was written in first person plural, and was the
only release in the sample written in first person at all. This supported the frame of the agency
being not faceless, but made up of human beings searching for answers to the same questions as
the audience. While the ad accused the CDC of wrongdoing, the CDC release reframed the
accusation as being not only against the CDC, but against several other very-well respected
health science and medical organizations—so instead of the accusation being against one
allegedly corrupt organization, the press release author reframed the issue as being against the
consensus of the entire scientific community.
In closing, the release said, “we have to also be careful not to base our health
recommendations on unproven hypotheses or fear.” 391 What the authors had crafted was a press
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release that encouraged empathy for the researchers and refuted the accusations of the
advertisement—all without giving Put Children First the “newsworthy” recognition they sought.
The CDC release never mentioned the organization’s name.
Issues often become issues because of the attention it receives in the press. By that logic,
it made sense for the CDC not to distribute numerous press releases denying the claims of those
insisting on a causal link between vaccines and autism. The journalists on the side of the provaccine-autism-link camp—whether they took that side out of a desire for balance, oppositional
journalism, sincere belief, or a simple need to sell papers—helped them frame the debate as that
of a secretive, uncaring government research agency victimizing innocent children. Their use of
observational and anecdotal evidence worked because it utilized episodic framing conducive to
accepting the emotional appeals of this evidence. On (journal) paper, that approach may make
sense, but it’s not working on newsprint.
Clearly the scientific community needs to take charge of the way this conversation is
framed if they want to regain control and authority over this discussion. They need to shift the
debate from the anecdotal frame back to that of the bigger societal picture. They may need to use
some emotional appeals straight out of the vaccine-autism-link camp’s playbook, but only long
enough to widen the frame.

Postscript to the Autism Debate, 2002-2007
The debate over whether vaccines cause autism seems far from over. After years of
studies by prestigious medical research organizations continuously refuted any link between the
two, a decision by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ National Vaccine Injury
Compensation program awarded compensation to a family whose daughter, they determined, had
suffered neurological damage when a routine series of immunizations aggravated an existing
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condition: a rare mitochondrial disorder. This was a drastic departure from the official stance,
and it grabbed headlines.
Although this happened outside of the time frame of this study, it is especially
noteworthy because it was in direct response to an article—not an ad this time—that appeared in
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution a week earlier. David Kirby, author of an anti-vaccine book 392 ,
and billed as an “investigative journalist,” wrote an opinion piece 393 , harshly criticizing the CDC
for not making an investigation of the vaccine-autism link a “top priority.” 394 He criticized health
officials for “commanding parents to settle down and adhere to the nation’s rigid immunization
regime,” suggested that CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberding was “lying” to the public by saying
the girl’s genetic disorder and immune reaction to vaccination was an “isolated, unusual case,”
and called the issue “a national emergency.” 395 In his article, Kirby invoked frames of fear, loss,
and government corruption and deception.
After 6 years of relative silence on the autism front, despite the vaccine-autism debate
raging in the nation’s press, the CDC’s press organization spoke up on March 28, 2008. Dr.
Anne Schuchat, the director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory
Diseases and the U. S. Assistant Surgeon General, wrote an article titled “CDC Responds to
Questions About Vaccines.” 396 This article was posted in the “In The News” section of CDC’s
media relations Web site, the same section as the press releases.
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In the article, Schuchat effectively turned the tables on Kirby. She applied a gain frame in
her response, invoking the benefits of vaccines in saving children’s lives, in contrast to his lossframed portrayal of sick people allowing themselves to be taken advantage of. Where he had
framed the CDC as a totalitarian “Big Brother” claiming to know what’s best for the nation’s
children, Schuchat placed Kirby in that same frame, by saying “the best source of guidance is the
child’s health care provider.” Where Kirby used the words “rigid” and “adamant” to describe
CDC officials and their policy on childhood vaccinations, Schuchat further refuted the
totalitarian frame, saying “there are instances when a child should not receive a recommended
vaccine,” and again recommending consulting with the family’s doctor. 397
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Conclusions
The CDC during the period under study was the country’s—and possibly the world’s—
leading agency for health communication. When faced with the need to communicate health
information to the public, people at the CDC realized they could address their communication
needs with the same scientific rigor and research efforts that they applied to diseases and health
conditions. As a result, their communications staff continues to hone their ability to effectively
reach the public.
The CDC’s leaders and press officers stepped up quickly and showed they were in
control during the listeriosis outbreak and West Nile Virus cases. They issued frequent press
releases containing updates so the public was never left wondering what was going on. More
importantly for the purposes of this study, the press was never left to doubt whether CDC’s
communication staff would provide them with information. The CDC’s quick response allowed
them to frame these issues as they saw fit. Most importantly for the agency, though, was the
ability to portray themselves as the competent experts.
The West Nile and listeriosis releases in this study show the agency to be in control
without being controlling. When the CDC first assumed the role of lead health communication
organization in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the agency had to exert itself as being
competent and in control. However, CDC and public health culture embraces the value of
building coalitions and getting local voices to convey their messages. This is especially
important with the autism issue, in which parents have started to distrust the government, or at
least harbor frustration at the fact that they don’t have answers to offer. The voices of other
scientists, community leaders, and health care professionals agreeing with the CDC’s opinion
certainly strengthen their position. More importantly, in a situation in which it outside of the
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CDC’s authority to dictate or enforce what they say is the healthy choice (vaccination), they have
to work to persuade the public that it’s the more attractive option. In cases like these, public
relations tactics are the agency’s best weapon.
Autism does not manifest itself through outbreaks and vectors, like listeriosis and West
Nile virus. The condition doesn’t carry the same sense of urgency or breaking news as an acute
illness. As such, a constant flow of updates would likely not be an appropriate way to
communicate with the press. On the other hand, the CDC was (and is) one of the most visible
and best-liked of all of the federal agencies, and it was the one from which people clamored for
answers on autism.
The CDC has been a leader in health communication research for almost as long as health
communication research has been a field. However, it isn’t clear whether they are using this
research to craft the messages they deliver via press release in the same manner they would
create messaging for a health campaign. For example, Hallahan discussed gain- and lossframing, and the corresponding risks people are willing to take in response to a message. The
research he summarized found that “the prospect of a loss has a far greater impact on decision
making than does the prospect of an equivalent gain.” This seems to partially explain anxiety
over vaccination. However, the research also found that people are willing to take greater risks if
it “means saving a life or reducing suffering.” 398 With that knowledge, CDC could frame
vaccination debate using the concept of herd immunity. The risk of injury from a vaccine may
seem less great when compared with the risk of causing illness, death, and suffering in others by
passing along an otherwise preventable disease.
The vaccine-autism debate has much larger implications than simply proving which side
is right. It is part of the ongoing debate over whether U.S. health policy will be decided by faith
398
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or science, and it is part of the debate—as old as the United States itself—over how much power
the federal government has over individual citizens. More immediate, however, are the
implications for the nation’s health if a critical mass of U.S. parents no longer view vaccination
as essential, and the herd immunity the country has enjoyed for the past several decades degrades
to the point that very young children, the elderly, and other immunocompromised people are no
longer protected. (This is especially important when increasing international travel and
emigration continue to import vaccine-preventable diseases.) Additionally, as some vaccination
proponents are quick to point out, if the bulk of research funding and public attention are focused
on proving or disproving this one cause (which they see as already disproven), that diverts
resources away from finding “real” causes and treatments.
Parikh’s recommendations would also help CDC staff with another framing problem they
have had with vaccine communication. Parikh suggested countering the emotional, loss-framed
messages of vaccine opponents with emotional, loss-framed messages of their own: he said they
should counter opponents’ images of autistic children that accompany claims of a scientificallyunproven causal relationship with vaccination with images of children with tetanus and other
vaccine-preventable diseases. 399 Colgrove and Bayer wrote of the press successfully changing
the focus of the debate by publishing stories on children disabled by vaccine-preventable
diseases. 400 The emotional content would not come from episodic framing, with the anecdotal
evidence of one autistic child’s story, but from thematic framing, with the image of one child,
sick with a vaccine-preventable disease, chosen to represent the millions of deaths and
disabilities prevented worldwide by universal vaccination campaigns.
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While newspapers and CDC press releases both exhorted people during the listeriosis
outbreak to protect themselves by thoroughly heating pre-cooked meat products, and while
certain individuals in USDA leadership were implicated for corruption (e.g., ignoring warnings,
performing inadequate inspections), one of the big discoveries through the course of that
outbreak was the fact that the system itself was flawed—it was shown to be inadequate to protect
consumers. Likewise, the discovery that West Nile virus was transmissible via organ transplant
and blood transfusion was not construed as a problem of individual responsibility either. It was
largely positioned as a systemic issue: that the U.S. does not have any way in place, nor is it
necessarily possible or feasible, to screen blood or donated organs for some deadly diseases,
including West Nile. The organ donor likely contracted the disease after she was already in a
coma, and from a blood transfusion, so even the patient representing the index case was herself a
victim of the same problems as the subsequent victims.
The coverage of autism, on the other hand, featured heavy use of episodic framing. There
were numerous personal stories about angry, frustrated parents and their struggles as they cope
with having an autistic child. Many stories featured activists and parents citing anecdotal
evidence; some blamed the government, the NIH, or the CDC. The episodic framing made it
possible to look at other “small-picture” frames that otherwise may not have been able to find
footing. Notably, value frames positioning the debate as both faith vs. science and personal
autonomy vs. big government were especially effective.
Why was the coverage of autism different? Autism is a complex condition applied to a
broad array of symptoms. The cause is unknown. The vaccine-specific part of the debate has
continued in the British and American press for over a decade. Perhaps the reporters covering
autism, like those who covered the anthrax attacks in 2001, resorted to non-expert sources to
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satisfy their readership’s appetite for new information and fresh angles. Or perhaps, also like the
reporters covering the anthrax attacks, they used these sources because of a dearth of information
coming from the official sources. By comparison, the listeriosis and West Nile issues were
characterized by an acute onset of an outbreak of an acute disease. When the press releases and
other new information from public health agencies stopped flowing, the story—or at least the
current incidence of the immediate threat—was over.
Could the CDC have exerted more influence over the public debate over autism? Like
questions about the causes of autism, that is difficult to answer. The debate over autism remained
active over the course of the study period (2002-2007), and the public wanted to hear news about
it, but relatively few scientific breakthroughs and new information about autism was released—
or at least, the information that was released did not herald the cause and cure the public hoped
the scientific community would find.
Framing and agenda-setting theories aver that the media decides what becomes “news”
by covering it as news, and that their coverage alone is adequate to make an issue “newsworthy.”
Likewise, many stories that should have otherwise been important were ignored by the public
because the press didn’t appear to have deemed them newsworthy. 401 It was as if CDC’s
leadership was applying agenda-setting theory—if they didn’t address the issue on a regular
basis, the issue would eventually fade away.
As much as the CDC’s response to the USA Today ad was warranted, and probably
needed, the fact that this one ad drove them to react in such a fashion, when no other amount of
accusations, protest, outcry, and even bad science had been able to, inadvertently gave credence
to what otherwise could have been framed as a tiny fringe group with an irrational bone to pick.
401

An example might be a chain of corporate media outlets giving no coverage to the controversy over media
consolidation; not necessarily because the issue is unimportant, but because it serves the interest of the parent
company to divert attention away from the potential impact of consolidation.

115
With the exception of the response to the 2006 USA Today ad, all of the releases pertained to
awareness, risk factors, and announcing research and partnerships. This indicates that the CDC’s
strategy was to refrain from making press releases unless there was some new information to
announce. This makes sense from a scientific standpoint, but the downside of this for the CDC is
that this silence allowed the agency’s accusers to frame the debate as a big, heartless government
infringing on the rights, health, and safety of the victimized individual.
From this study, it appears that the CDC has the most success garnering favorable
coverage when they keep the public informed. Factual, informative press releases were issued
frequently during the listeriosis outbreak and the West Nile organ transplant scare. The public
and the press wanted information on these health issues, and the CDC provided it. With the West
Nile/organ transplant case, Dr. Gerberding seemed quite capable of giving the impression the
investigation was under control despite the fact that they didn’t know what was going on at first,
and what they suspected actually sounded like something out of a horror movie. As a result, the
press framed the CDC in a generally positive light, as being an active partner in working for
public health.
With the Autism debate, the CDC’s lack of public attention to autism (at least compared
to the attention the press was giving it) inadvertently framed the autism debate as either
unimportant or inappropriate for the public sphere and to the U.S. government. Once CDC
autism researchers and communication staff saw the vigor (and lack of scientific rigor) with
which this issue came to be debated in the press, they would have almost certainly benefited had
they responded with a similar level of vigor. A crisis-communication-style response, with CDC
spokespeople listening to members of the public and addressing their fears and concerns would
have quieted the anti-vaccine sentiment. It is likely that if CDC scientists and health
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communicators had been more active, rather than reactive, in their response, even with their
empathy, it could have soothed the anger of a small but vocal public. It is not too late to start
down this path.
Positive framing tactics would also be helpful in addressing the autism debate. Wallack et
al. wrote that “emphasizing the positive is a common tactic in framing contests.” 402 Although
autism is a devastating condition with no known cure or cause, there are still positive things that
the CDC’s media relations staff can say about the subject of autism. The anti-vaccine activists
and their negative/loss frames could be contested with positive ones talking about the research
CDC’s scientists are doing, the research CDC is funding, and the groups with which the agency
is collaborating. As was mentioned in the previous section, the millions of lives saved and
disabling diseases prevented through vaccination is easy to show in a positive frame.
The truth is that the autism issue was a very complex and touchy subject, and it would
have been difficult for any non-activist organization to emerge from it unscathed. The CDC’s
autism research leadership and media relations staff did what they thought was the right thing to
do in responding to the issue. West Nile and listeriosis were handled well and professionally.
The fact that they were comparatively short health episodes helped the CDC’s leadership and
media relations staff maintain interest with the press and the public until the outbreaks were over,
but their relationship with, and efforts to reach, the press should not be discounted. The volumes
of communication research their employees and contractors are now doing, the widespread
sharing of lessons learned through their free journals, and recognition of their past successes
practically ensures that they will continue to succeed in their mission to improve the world’s
health. Certainly there are always mistakes to be made, but they appear to have the knowledge,
skills, and dedication to ensure they learn from their lessons.
402
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Reporters make decisions that frame news and set agendas. To some degree, they decide
what is going to be covered, and how it will be covered. This being the case, perhaps the CDC
could use framing theory to help position their press releases to resonate with the press.
Journalists have needs that effective press releases must meet. Journalists seek to provide
balance (often in the form of multiple viewpoints), readership (which drives revenue for their
newspapers), and information. In order to address these needs, CDC Media Relations should
consider some tips from the corporate PR playbook. Lordan wrote about the blurred lines
between the jobs of public relations professionals and journalists. He maintained that it was
essential that the two remain separated, to maintain the credibility of both 403 , but the areas of
overlap he mentioned are helpful. Lordan said that both fields use similar tools, methods, and
jargon, and work under the same kinds of deadlines. 404 The CDC’s PR staff could use this
common ground, in addition to a shared interest in public health, to anticipate the needs of
journalists better. They could be more active in writing releases with tempting or interesting
story lines or angles, and they could provide the kind of background information that lends itself
to thematic rather than episodic framing.
They should also learn from the successes of their opponents, who have used emotional
frames to evoke panic, fear, and the sense that “big government” is increasingly intruding into
people’s lives. The literature shows that episodic framing and going for the easy emotional
appeal is “bad” journalism from the standpoint that it misrepresents the actual situation and
neglects the context and underlying causes of an issue, but “good” journalism in the sense that it
engages the reader and sells newspapers.
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It would be irresponsible—and counterproductive—for a government agency in a
democratic country to use deliberate fear appeals and emotional framing to garner press coverage
in most situations. For example, it was in the best interest of the CDC, and the cause of public
health in general, to not incite fear or frame emotionally in the case of the West Nile virus
transmission through organ transplants, because doing so would cause further, unnecessary risk
to public health. The agency’s communication personnel kept reporters and the public
continually informed of the unfolding situation as well as the best ways to prevent West Nile
virus, hoping to minimize the amount of panic over any potential risk to the blood or organ
supply, or to the risk to recipients of donated blood or organs. If people had been afraid to donate
blood or receive life-saving blood or transplants, the public health impact would have been far
greater than that of the four people who contracted West Nile through their transplants. In this
case, thematic framing served best for everyone involved.
The approach needs to be tailored to the situation. The framing that worked for the West
Nile virus/organ transplant issue wouldn’t have worked as well for the 2002 listeriosis outbreak.
The listeriosis outbreak carried a higher risk of illness for the general public; only a relative few
people need organ transplants, but everyone has to eat. The message had to be compelling
enough to communicate the necessary prevention message. And while the unfolding
investigation of the corrupt meat industry made for compelling news, CDC staff had to be careful
not to get into legal trouble implicating Pilgrim’s Pride or step on the toes of their fellow
government employees at the USDA.
The press releases for West Nile and listeriosis showed that CDC communication staff
have embraced the lessons learned about risk and crisis communication during and after the 2001
anthrax attacks. However, with the exception of the response to the 2006 USA Today ad, those
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lessons did not appear to have been applied in the case of the autism releases. Autism was treated
as a just another ongoing research subject (albeit a particularly frustrating one), but to the
effected population, it is every bit as stressful and frightening as the anthrax attacks. As was seen
in the wide variety of coverage and angles in the autism newspaper stories, people want answers.
Absent those answers, people want assurance that the government is trying their best to help
them.
Professionals from all over the CDC engage in innumerable purposeful health
communications efforts. The CDC has participates in many effective nationwide, multi-year
campaigns with large budgets aimed at getting people to perform an action (e.g., VERB: It’s
What You Do 405 , a campaign to encourage physical activity in tweens), educate themselves (e.g.,
Get Smart: Know When Antibiotics Work 406 ), screen for diseases and conditions (e.g., Learn the
Signs: Act Early, a campaign to help parents recognize the signs of developmental delays and
begin intervening as early as possible 407 ), or engage in a preventive behavior (e.g., Choose Your
Cover 408 , a skin cancer prevention campaign). In 2004 the agency created the National Center
for Health Marketing, which takes proven theories and methods of developing, pricing, and
selling products and bad behaviors and uses them to market and “sell” health behaviors.
CDC Media Relations staff should consider taking the same careful, assertive approach to
its press releases. Certainly, as in the case of the West Nile virus and listeriosis outbreaks studied
here, press releases are often written under the same sorts of tight deadlines and limited flows of
information that newspaper reporters experience. However, with ongoing issues like autism, the

405

http://www.cdc.gov/youthcampaign/
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/community/campaign_materials.htm
407
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/actearly/
408
http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/skin/chooseyourcover/
406

120
CDC as a whole and its image would likely benefit from a more aggressive PR effort, whether as
a stand-alone campaign or as part of a larger campaign.

Limitations
The CDC proved to be a difficult subject at times in that it was often impossible to
determine who was responsible for any given communication decision, policy, or piece. As a
government agency with 16,000 employees and contractors, and with many of the hundreds of
teams, branches, and divisions within the agency having their own communication personnel in
addition to the main Office of Communication (under which the Office of Media Relations
operates) and the separate National Center for Health Marketing, communication can come from
many different sources within the CDC. Furthermore, scientists and researchers beyond a certain
career level (typically GS-13) are often called upon to give quotable interviews to the press,
while communications staff, including authors of press releases, do not receive attribution.
Complicating these matters is the fact that the CDC is a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy—
CDC staff are expected to speak with one voice, and they are part of an administration that
encourages all its leaders to also speak with one voice. All of these factors make it difficult, if
not impossible, to tell who is responsible for any decision or action regarding CDC
communication.

Areas For Future Research
Questions remain about why CDC’s communications staff didn’t choose to address the
autism debate in a more aggressive manner. One question that would benefit from additional
research is whether Bush administration policies influenced the CDC’s communication staff and
autism researchers not to actively fight vaccine opponents who threatened the viability of the
U.S. vaccination program with beliefs based on anecdotal evidence. President George W. Bush
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created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative in 2001 to encourage
involvement of faith-based organizations in public health; in 2002 he issued the President’s
Management Agenda which supported public funding of these organizations. 409 Vaccine
opponents often use religious exemptions to support their nonscientific beliefs about a vaccineautism link in order to prevent their own children from being vaccinated. The existing literature
that could serve as a foundation for this research includes discussions of the Bush
administration’s desire to have tight control over scientific communication 410 and public health
communication 411 , of their desire to silence and/or censor the voices of science 412 , and of the
potential implications of this administration’s initiative to lessen the separation of church and
state by promoting government funding of faith-based initiatives. 413
Another area for future research would be to determine whether public health coverage
experienced a framing shift over the past decade and a half. Writing in 1993, Wallack et al. said
that health issues are usually framed as individual responsibility, to the exclusion of implicating
systemic problems. 414 While that is certainly true for lifestyle-related conditions (as the authors
said) like obesity and type 2 diabetes, this seems less true for the coverage of listeriosis and West
Nile Virus cases used in this study. An interesting future study might be one to determine

409
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whether this is because of the peculiarities of these particular issues, or if this is a result of a shift
in framing behavior. The public has become much more aware of public health activities,
policies, and infrastructure since the 2001 anthrax attacks, and that could have an effect on
framing trends in public health issues.
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